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“I just love working in this team. It's one of the most satisfying jobs I've ever had. I 
thrive on being able to use my skills and being appreciated by my fellow team members for 
what I know, while they also know my limitations, allowing me to learn lots of new skills at 
the same time. This job makes me feel useful and part of something special.”  
Examples like the one above show that people care a lot about how they think 
others see them (e.g., Kenny, 1994; Sheldon, & Johnson, 1993). In order to get an idea of 
the impression one makes, people constantly monitor reactions toward them during 
social interaction. This becomes especially clear with public appearances such as a 
speech or a presentation when people want to know afterwards: “How did I come 
across?”, “How did the audience react?”, “Do you think they liked me?” Such social 
feedback, whether it is in the form of compliments, a critical note, or non-verbal 
reactions, helps people in their attempts to read the minds of others and to draw 
conclusions about how they are perceived (Rentsch & Woehr, 2004). These beliefs about 
how someone thinks s/he is viewed by others are called meta-perceptions (Kenny, 
1994).  
Meta-perceptions fall under the umbrella of interpersonal perception: an area of 
social psychology that refers to the judgments people form about one another in their 
daily interactions (Kenny, 1994). These judgments can be about themselves (i.e. self-
perception, e.g., “I am extroverted”), about others (i.e. other-perception, e.g., “Jane is 
introverted”), or about others’ perception of themselves (i.e. meta-perception, e.g., “I think 
that Jane thinks I am introverted”). Interpersonal perception is often contrasted to 
object perception. While object perception helps people navigate in the real world (e.g., 
“John sees that his bike has a flat tire and, therefore, goes by car”), interpersonal 
perception helps people navigate in the social world (e.g., “John seems cranky today, I 
will ask for his advice tomorrow”).  
Someone’s meta-perceptions are important determinants of his or her behavior. 
That is, individuals often adjust their actions to how they think others perceive them. 
For example, people who think that specific others view them negatively are more likely 
to start interactions with these others in an angry and hostile manner (Butz & Plant, 
2006). In contrast, if people think that members of a group they belong to recognize 




accept more obligations (e.g., Tyler & Blader, 2003). Because of this importance of meta-
perceptions for the behavior of the person that holds the meta-perceptions, meta-
perceptions have been examined in many different settings. These settings vary from 
intimate relations studies that typically examine effects of meta-perceptions of one’s 
romantic partner on relationship satisfaction (e.g., Murray, Holmes, & Collins, 2006), to 
intergroup settings in which people are reluctant to interact with members from a 
different social group because they think they hold a negative image of them (cf. Gordijn, 
Finchilescu, Brix, Wijnants, & Koomen, 2008). 
Since meta-perceptions have been proven to be important predictors of affect 
and behavior in many different settings, one would expect that they will also play an 
important role in work settings. However, surprisingly, research regarding meta-
perceptions in work settings is very scarce (see King, Kaplan, & Zaccaro, 2008, for a 
similar observation). Below, I will present the result of a literature review to provide an 
overview of the research on meta-perception in different contexts, and to show that the 
role of meta-perceptions has largely been neglected in research on work and work team 
settings. I will categorize the meta-perception literature in four clusters based on the 
keywords mentioned in the articles under scrutiny and the type of journals they were 
published in.  
Overview of the Meta-Perception Literature 
Entering the search terms meta-perception and metaperception in the Web of 
Science database yielded 63 results. I included all empirical articles in this review that 
were consistent with the abovementioned definition of meta-perception (i.e. people’s 
beliefs about how they are seen by others). For the sake of comparison, I excluded the 
qualitative studies. This resulted in a final sample of 39 articles that are listed in Table 
1.1. Even though this overview is not exhaustive because I did not search on related but 
different constructs as meta-accuracy or meta-insight, it gives a good general and 
representative overview of the meta-perception literature. I grouped the articles in four 
clusters related to different psychological disciplines: intergroup relations, interpersonal 
perception, intimate relations, and clinical psychology. Two studies did not fall clearly 
into one of these categories, therefore, they are not further discussed. The studies in 
each cluster focus on different aspects of meta-perceptions. Therefore, I give a short 
overview of each cluster in which I discuss the setting/sample used in the studies, as 




























































































   
   
   
   

























































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   























































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   





































































































































































































































 The common denominator of the meta-perception studies in this cluster is their 
intergroup setting. In an intergroup setting, individuals from at least two different social 
groups interact or anticipate interaction. The social groups studied in this cluster vary 
from policemen to members of minority groups based on people’s ethnicity or sexual 
preference. The basic premise about intergroup contact here is that the cues people rely 
on in meta-perception formation depend on whether their interaction partner is from 
their own group (an in-group member) or from a different group (an out-group 
member). That is, when interacting with an out-group member, meta-perceptions are 
expected to be based on stereotypes instead of individual characteristics such as 
personality or values (Frey & Tropp, 2006; King et al., 2008). The participants in these 
studies are almost exclusively students from a minority or a lower-status group that 
anticipate interaction with students from a majority or a higher-status group (cf. King et 
al., 2008) (e.g., gay vs. heterosexual individuals, or Whites vs. Blacks). The only 
exception to the student samples is the study of Tuohy and Wrennall (1995) about 
Scottish policemen’s view of how the public sees them.  
 The content of the meta-perceptions in these articles is the stereotype of out-
group members toward the social group the perceiver belongs to. A stereotype is a 
general, often negative view that people have of an individual solely based on the social 
group this individual belongs to. For example, the stereotype of South-African Blacks is 
that they are unreliable and unmannerly. A study from Gordijn et al. (2008) has shown 
that Blacks indeed tend to think that Whites (out-group members) hold this stereotypic 
image of them and see them as unreliable and unmannerly. For that reason, this specific 
category of meta-perception is also referred to as meta-stereotypes. Meta-stereotypes 
are “normal” meta-perceptions, but with a specific content: the current stereotype of the 
social group in question (e.g., Vorauer, Hunter, Main, & Roy, 2000).  
 The studies in this intergroup relations cluster primarily examine potential 
buffers against the development of negative meta-perceptions in intergroup relations 
such as friendship network diversity (Wout, Murphy, & Steele, 2010). However, some 
also report effects of these meta-stereotypes. Most importantly, believing to be viewed 
negatively due to membership of a group affects feelings toward members of the out-




refrain from becoming friends with a White student because he may think that this 
White student holds a stereotypic image of him and sees him as unreliable and 
unmannered. Because meta-stereotypes make people feel that they cannot be 
themselves in intergroup interactions, they may affect intergroup interaction regardless 
of this particular White student’s actual perception of Black people (Wout et al., 2010). 
Also, negative meta-perceptions such as perceived heterosexism by gay people have 
been shown to affect their psychological well-being (Swim, Johnston, & Pearson, 2009) 
Interpersonal perception 
The setting for meta-perception studies in the interpersonal perception cluster is 
mainly a student sample. There are only three out of the fourteen studies in this cluster 
that do not use student samples. That is, Malloy, Albright, Kenny, Agatstein, and 
Winquist (1997) recruited volunteers by phone and Malloy, Albright, and Scarpati’s 
(2007) sample comprised school children. Finally, there is one work setting in which 
employees were asked to what extent they thought their superiors, peers, and 
subordinates thought they would know the correct answer to a specific accountancy 
problem (Tan & Jamal, 2006). However, in contrast to the intergroup relations cluster, 
the main focus in the interpersonal perception cluster lies on the individual self in 
relation to other individuals instead of on the interaction between different social 
groups. This “other” individual may be a “generalized”, a “differential” or a “dyadic” 
other (see Kenny, 1994 for a more extensive discussion of this distinction). A meta-
perception of a “generalized” other refers to how someone thinks others in general see 
one (e.g., “People see me as extraverted”). A meta-perception of a “differential” other 
refers to how an individual thinks people from different social groups see him or her 
(e.g., “My co-workers see me as extraverted, but my family sees me as introverted”). 
Carlson and Furr (2009), for example, tried to differentiate between meta-perceptions 
from a parent, a college friend, and a hometown friend. Finally, a meta-perception of a 
“dyadic” other refers to how someone thinks a specific other individual sees him or her 
(e.g., “I think John sees me as extraverted, whereas Jane sees me as introverted”).  
The content of the meta-perceptions about the “generalized” other in this cluster 
most often consists of personality traits such as the Big Five (cf. Albright & Malloy, 
1999) or individual qualities such as leadership skills (Malloy & Janowski (1992). In the 




such as liking (e.g., Levesque, 1997) or a student’s expected value as a professional 
contact (Elfenbein, Eisenkraft, & Ding 2009).  
The interpersonal perception studies in our literature review do not examine 
effects of meta-perceptions. Instead, they mainly focus on the discrepancy between 
meta-perception and other-perception. This is often referred to as meta-accuracy or 
meta-insight (Elfenbein et al., 2009). Research in this cluster has shown, for example, 
that self-observation on video (Albright & Malloy, 1999) and face-to-face rather than 
computer-mediated feedback (Hebert & Vorauer, 2003) can increase meta-accuracy. 
Moreover, findings from Carlson, Vazire, & Furr (2011) suggest that people have some 
genuine insight into how others see them and do not achieve meta-accuracy by only 
relying on the assumption that others see them similarly to how they see themselves. 
Intimate relations 
As the name indicates, the setting of the studies in this cluster is an intimate 
relationship. An intimate relationship is an interpersonal connection that involves 
physical and/or emotional intimacy (Brehm, Miller, Perlman & Campbell, 2002). In this 
category of meta-perception studies, the focus lies on the relationship between the self 
and a (potential) close other. The participants in these studies are generally college 
students who meta-perceive close others (e.g., family members, or [potential] dating 
partners). However, three of the studies in our review used different populations. 
Dijkstra and Barelds (2011) surveyed female respondents from a women’s magazine, 
and Swami, Waters and Furnham (2010) studied a sample of men and women from the 
London population. Finally, Bellmore and Cillessen’s (2003) article studied fourth grade 
children and their classmates.  
The content of the meta-perceptions examined in these studies depends on the 
type of intimate relationship under scrutiny. In the case of relationships with spouses, 
or (potential) dating partners, the meta-perceptions are often about (physical) 
attractiveness (Marcus & Miller, 2003). For example, to what extent a person thinks that 
his/her partner finds him/her attractive. In the case of close peers the meta-perceptions 
are more about general popularity or liking (e.g., Cook & Douglas, 1998). Also, 
personality traits are examined in some studies. Sciangula and Morry (2010), for 
example, studied meta-perceptions regarding forty personality traits, including 




In this cluster some studies also report the effects of meta-perceptions on 
relationship quality. For example, Cook and Douglas (1998) show that greater perceived 
acceptance by same-sex peers (=meta-perception) leads to a more positive social 
standing in the peer system. Also, in romantic relationships, meta-perceptions of 
personality and attractiveness have been shown to predict romantic love, relationship 
satisfaction, and intention to quit the relationship (cf. Sciangula & Morry 2010; Swami et 
al., 2010). 
Clinical psychology 
The central question in this literature stream is whether people who score higher 
on clinical pathopsychological measures such as phobia or narcissism have different 
meta-perceptions than people from non-clinical groups. For example, do lonely people 
think others like them less (Tsai & Reis, 2009)? The claimed setting of the studies in this 
cluster is of a clinical nature. However, in all but one study these clinical variables are 
measured using (healthy) students. Only one study did not make use of student 
samples. Oltmanns, Gleason, Klonsky, and Turkheimer (2005) used a sample of 2026 Air 
Force recruits from an Air Force Base in Texas.  
The content of the meta-perceptions in this cluster is generally related to the 
content of the clinical measures that are used. For example, when examining narcissists, 
the meta-perceptions focus on characteristics of narcissism, such as arrogance. That is, 
do narcissists think that they come across as more arrogant than people that are less 
narcissistic (Carlson, Vazire, & Oltmanns (2011)? The findings in this cluster show that 
meta-perceptions of pathological personality traits are generally positively associated 
with actual other-ratings even if the participants themselves disagree with these meta-
perceptions. In other words, individuals have some knowledge, beyond their own 
beliefs about themselves (self-ratings), of what their peers think of them.  
The studies in this cluster in this literature review have not looked at the effects 
of meta-perceptions. 
Summary 
There are three conclusions that can be drawn from this global literature review 
of these meta-perceptions studies. First, research on meta-perceptions in a work setting 
and especially in work teams, is scarce. Second, the content of the meta-perceptions is 
generally (pathopsychological) personality or stereotypes. Almost no research has 




exists regarding the effects of meta-perceptions. Nevertheless, even though research on 
the effects of positive meta-perceptions in these studies is less prevalent than research 
on its development, the reported effects are all positive. Below, we will discuss these 
issues in more detail and identify voids in the literature. Based on this discussion, we 
will develop our research question and propose directions for research. 
Gaps: Setting, Content, and Effects of Meta-Perceptions 
Setting: meta-perceptions in work teams 
The first conclusion from our literature review was that research has hardly 
examined meta-perceptions in a work context, let alone in a work team setting. This is 
an important realization because meta-perceptions have been theoretically argued, and, 
to a lesser extent, empirically shown to guide behavior in significant ways, and have the 
potential to strongly affect motivation and behavior at work. Moreover, people often 
spend more time at work than with their family and friends, and, therefore, it is 
important that they feel good at work. If they do not, they may become ill or may even 
leave the company. In the present dissertation I, therefore, examine meta-perceptions in 
a work context. More specifically, since work is more and more organized around teams 
(e.g., Devine, Clayton, Philips, Dunford, & Melner, 1999) I will focus on meta-perceptions 
in work teams. Members of work teams are, by definition, interdependent (Kozlowski & 
Ilgen, 2006), and research suggests that individuals are especially motivated to be 
viewed positively by people they depend on (see, for example, Stevens & Fiske, 2000). 
Hence, meta-perceptions may be particularly important in a work team context.  
Even though, similar to all other types of perception, meta-perceptions originate 
at the individual level, one could expect that they may also translate into a collective, 
team-level perception. This idea is consistent with the abundance of research and 
theory about convergent team perception or emerging team climates. For example, in 
their overview of effective teams, Kozlowski and Ilgen (2006) mention that collective 
team beliefs may result from factors such as leadership, social interaction, sharing of 
perspectives, and collective sense making. Examining potential team-level meta-
perception is important because for organizations it is not only interesting to know 
what may affect the performance and motivation of single individuals but also that of 
teams as a whole. Moreover, in a team context in which individuals are interdependent, 
it is important to also look at team-level outcomes. The above suggests that meta-




level of analysis. For that reason, I will adopt a multi-level lens in this dissertation and 
focus on meta-perception of both the individual team member as well as of teams as a 
whole.  
The content of meta-perceptions: expertise 
As mentioned above, the meta-perception literature has shown that people have 
beliefs about how others perceive them with regard to different areas. Several types of 
meta-perceptions have been studied, varying from liking (Reno & Kenny, 1992), to 
social behavior (Albright, & Malloy, 1999), and from personality traits (Malloy & 
Janowski, 1992) to personality disorders (Oltmanns et al., 2005). However, to my 
knowledge, there is no research that has specifically focused on meta-perception of 
expertise. It is important to focus on meta-perceptions of expertise, because it is one of 
the most important characteristics that people use to define who they are at work (see 
Molleman & Broekhuis, 2012; Molleman, Broekhuis, Stoffels, & Jaspers, 2010). 
Moreover, in work teams expertise is a highly salient defining characteristic of 
the individual members (cf. MacPhail, Roloff, & Edmondson, 2009; Van der Vegt & 
Bunderson, 2005) because it is an important cognitive resource for the accomplishment 
of the team task (Faraj & Sproull, 2000), and, therefore, critical to team performance. 
Moreover, expertise is a highly salient social category for defining who a team member 
is (e.g., he is a psychologist) or is not (e.g., no, he is not an economist) (Zhong, Phillips, 
Leonardelli, & Galinsky, 2008). This is illustrated by the common observation that team 
members tend to answer the question “Who are you?” with a reference to their 
expertise domain (e.g., “I am Pete, I am a software developer”). Finally, expertise is a 
positive quality because it incorporates someone’s strengths, talents and skills, derived 
from education, work experience, functional backgrounds and social memberships (Van 
der Vegt & Bunderson, 2005). Their expertise makes team members feel unique and 
distinct and able to offer a unique contribution to their team as an expert (Adarves-
Yorno, Postmes, & Haslam, 2006; Brewer & Gardner, 1996). In teams, individual 
members are expected to integrate their expertise with workers across different 
specializations (e.g., Devine et al., 1999), making expertise an important and salient 
status characteristic of the individual team members. For these reasons, I focus on 





The effects of meta-perceptions of expertise in work teams 
Even though the effects of meta-perceptions I encountered in the literature were 
all positive, the number of studies focusing on the effects of meta-perceptions is small, 
and no research has addressed the effects of meta-perceptions with regard to expertise 
in work teams. Examining such effects is nevertheless important. This is evident from 
the example I started this chapter with and when one considers the numerous stories at 
parties in which people, for example, mention their “thankless job” and how they feel 
that the long hours they work for their team go unnoticed. This also becomes evident 
from a large survey study among 8,000 American employees that revealed that a lack of 
appreciation was the number three reason why they wanted to leave their current job 
(Malachowski, n.d.). People seem to complain a lot about the lack of recognition they 
receive at work and the fact that they think their co-workers do not realize how 
complicated their job is, how much effort they put into it and how they feel taken for 
granted at work. In short, people are very preoccupied with whether they think fellow 
worker acknowledge, respect and recognize their expertise. If employees think that 
others acknowledge their expertise, this may motivate them to go the extra mile and to 
provide this expertise to the other team members to help them to do their job properly. 
If employees feel that their knowledge and skills are not recognized, they may stop 
offering advice and helping co-workers. Since organizations increasingly organize work 
around teams in which employees with complementary expertise must cooperate in 
order to perform complex tasks, not sharing knowledge may undermine the 
performance of a team, and ultimately, the entire organization (e.g., Cabrera & Cabrera, 
2002).  
Toward a research question 
In short, it seems common knowledge that people feel better, work harder, and 
stay longer in a work environment where they feel that their skills and abilities are 
recognized, acknowledged, and respected. But is this actually the case? Will people work 
harder and perform better if they believe their qualities are appreciated? Do teams 
perform better if there is an atmosphere in which members believe their fellow 
members acknowledge their strengths? What exactly is this belief of appreciation or 
affirmation of expertise? How is it different from other concepts that have been related 
to successful team work? How does it develop? These are questions I will try to answer 




the understanding of the role of team members’ beliefs about whether their fellow team 
members acknowledge, recognize and respect their knowledge, skills and abilities in 
work teams. As indicated above, I will adopt a multi-level lens to examine these meta-
perceptions. At the individual level, I will refer to this type of meta-perception as 
perceived expertise affirmation and to reciprocal expertise affirmation at the team level 
(cf. MacPhail et al., 2009). I aim to develop a clearer view of what it is, how it develops 
and what its effects are for the performance of individual members as well as for teams 
as a whole.  
Contributions 
In the present dissertation, I aim to offer three important contributions. First, I 
will validate the construct of perceived expertise affirmation and develop a measure to 
assess it and examine important correlates of perceived expertise affirmation at both 
the individual and team levels of analysis. 
Second, I will shed light on the development of perceived expertise affirmation in 
work teams, taking into account multiple levels of analysis. I will show that perceived 
expertise affirmation is an individual belief and discuss two individual-level 
antecedents. Moreover, I will argue and show that perceived expertise affirmation is not 
only relevant at the individual level of analysis but that, as a result of inter-team 
differences in longevity and size, work teams will also develop meaningful differences in 
their levels of perceived expertise affirmation. I will argue that in teams with high levels 
of perceived expertise affirmation a collective belief develops in which members believe 
their expertise is valued and respected, which I will refer to as reciprocal expertise 
affirmation (MacPhail et al., 2009).  
Third, I propose that perceived expertise affirmation has important implications 
for both individual as well as team performance. At the individual level of analysis, I 
expect a direct relationship between perceived expertise affirmation and individual 
performance. At the team level of analysis, I expect that reciprocal expertise affirmation 
also has consequences for the effective functioning of work team as a whole. However, 
this relationship may be more complex. Because the interdependent nature of the tasks 
in work teams requires the coordination of individual members’ contributions, I argue 
that reciprocal expertise affirmation alone is not sufficient for high team performance 
but also requires a coordination mechanism that helps to align the individual efforts. 




value of individuality and diversity and may reinforce expressions of individual 
differentiation by making members feel that everyone’s expertise is important and 
valued, increasing motivation (Bettencourt & Sheldon, 2001; Jetten, Postmes, & 
McAuliffe, 2002). These heightened levels of motivation and efforts of individuals 
resulting from perceived expertise affirmation need to be coordinated in order to result 
in higher levels of team performance. Incorporating insights from the team cognition 
literature, that emphasize the importance of shared mental models for interpersonal 
coordination (e.g., Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Rico, Sánchez-Manzanares, 
Gil, & Gibson, 2008), I propose that the effects of reciprocal expertise affirmation on 
team performance will depend on the extent to which team members have a shared 
mental model of “who knows what” in the team (cf. Austin, 2003; Wegner, 1986).  
Overview of the Present Dissertation 
 In the present dissertation, I examine the role of perceived expertise affirmation 
in work teams. My main purpose is to shed light on the conceptualization of the 
construct, its development and correlates at the level of the individual team member 
and for teams as a whole. In order to address these questions, I conduct three studies 
that I report in the Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Each chapter is written as an independent 
article and can be read separately of the rest of the dissertation. As a result, there is 
some overlap between the chapters.   
 A first step in gaining more knowledge about what a construct is and what it is 
not, is to relate and distinguish it from other, seemingly related constructs and to make 
it measurable. Therefore, in Chapter 2, I start out with a theoretical conceptualization 
and empirical validation of perceived expertise affirmation at both the individual and 
team levels of analysis. I argue that perceived expertise affirmation is a multi-level 
construct that originates in team members’ individual perceptions and materializes into 
a higher-level collective team construct: reciprocal expertise affirmation —i.e. the 
mutual recognition by team members that they respect, value, and affirm each other’s 
expertise—. Moreover, I relate and distinguish perceived expertise affirmation and 
reciprocal expertise affirmation from seemingly related constructs at both the 
individual as well as the team level of analysis, respectively. I validate perceived 
expertise affirmation and reciprocal expertise affirmation by means of two 
confirmatory factor analyses in a field study among 155 white-collar workers in teams 




In Chapter 3, I extend the insights from Chapter 2 and develop a multi-level 
model with correlates of perceived expertise affirmation in work teams using multi-
source data from 86 organizational work teams of 400 white-collar workers and their 
supervisors. At the individual level of analysis, I expect that similarities in educational 
background and levels of relative expertise among team members positively predict 
individual perceived expertise affirmation. Moreover, I expect that perceived expertise 
affirmation and reciprocal expertise affirmation both positively predict supervisor-
rated individual performance. At the team level of analysis, I examine whether smaller 
teams and teams in which members have worked together for a longer period of time 
develop higher levels of reciprocal expertise affirmation. Moreover, I examine the team-
level relationship between reciprocal expertise affirmation and team performance and 
propose that this relationship is moderated by sharedness of expertise perceptions. 
 In Chapter 4, I focus on the team level of analysis and examine how and when 
reciprocal expertise affirmation improves team performance. I replicate the findings as 
presented in Chapter 3 that reciprocal expertise affirmation is positively related to team 
performance, but only in teams with high levels of shared expertise perceptions. 
Moreover, I extend this model by proposing that the joint effects of teams’ reciprocal 
expertise affirmation and sharedness of expertise perceptions on team performance 
will be mediated by coordinated action. Data from 226 members of 39 student teams, 
working on a realistic four-week business simulation, support these hypotheses.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, I summarize and integrate the main findings of my 
dissertation. I discuss the strengths and limitations of the studies I conducted, and end 
with the theoretical and practical implications of the combined findings and with some 




PERCEIVED EXPERTISE AFFIRMATION IN WORK TEAMS: A MULTI-LEVEL CONSTRUCT 
VALIDATION STUDY  
Introduction 
Employees’ belief that others recognize and acknowledge their task-related 
knowledge, skills, and abilities (henceforth perceived expertise affirmation) is a crucial 
determinant of their well-being and performance. For example, a large survey study 
among 8,000 American employees revealed that a lack of appreciation was the number 
three reason why they wanted to leave their current job (Malachowski, n.d.). Moreover, 
a recent poll by Kaisen Consulting Ltd. revealed that recognition was the number three 
motivator at work, whereas a lack of recognition was the number two demotivator 
(Robb & Myatt, n.d.). Also, a large Harris Poll already indicated in 2000 that out of the 
American employees who received a lot of appreciation for their work, 68% were very 
satisfied with their jobs versus only 13% of those who received little or no appreciation 
(Taylor, 2000).  
Perceived expertise affirmation can be expected to be especially important in 
work teams because people are particularly sensitive to how they are viewed by others 
they depend on (see, for example, Stevens & Fiske, 2000). However, in spite of its 
relevance for organizations, and calls to examine the role of perceived expertise 
affirmation in work teams (MacPhail, Roloff, & Edmondson, 2009), little empirical 
research has addressed this topic. The goal of the current study is to introduce and 
clearly define perceived expertise affirmation, and to stimulate research in this area by 
developing and validating a measure of perceived expertise affirmation in work teams.  
Because teams are social systems that are comprised of individual team 
members, it is likely that perceived expertise affirmation will not only play a role at the 
level of the individual team member, but also at the team level of analysis. Therefore, in 
this study, we use the multi-level framework for construct validation from Chen, 
Mathieu, and Bliese (2004). This framework consists of five consecutive steps that 
provide complementary evidence about the overall validity of a multi-level construct 
(see Chen et al., 2004 for a detailed description of each step). In the remainder of this 
chapter, we follow these five steps to determine the validity of perceived expertise 
affirmation. First, we define perceived expertise affirmation at the individual and team 




from its lower-level counterpart. Third, we test the psychometric properties of the 
construct at both levels of analysis. Fourth, we examine the extent to which perceived 
expertise affirmation varies at the individual and team levels of analysis. Fifth, we 
examine the relationship of the focal construct with theoretically related constructs at 
both levels of analysis. Steps 1 and 2 outlined above are theoretical in nature, while 
steps 3 through 5 comprise empirical testing. We conduct the required empirical tests 
in the latter steps on data from a survey study among 164 white-collar workers from 
teams from a variety of industry sectors.  
Step 1: Construct definition 
The individual-level construct: Perceived expertise affirmation 
Because people have a fundamental need to feel recognized and respected by 
important others (e.g., Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman, 1959; Maslow, 1943), they 
continuously strive for affirmation of positive parts of their identity (Ashforth & 
Kreiner, 1999; Cornelissen, Haslam, & Balmer, 2007). Research has shown that people 
not only put a lot of time and effort into examining how others interact with them (King, 
Kaplan, & Zaccaro, 2008; Sheldon & Johnson, 1993), they even try to structure their 
social encounters in ways to receive affirmation from their interaction partners. For 
example, people tend to talk more with others who give them compliments than with 
those who treat them with disrespect (Jones, 1973). Also, people often engage in 
impression management to bring their qualities to the attention of others (for a review, 
see Schlenker, 2003). Ideally, this striving for affirmation results in the belief that others 
are aware of one’s individual qualities. We refer to this state as perceived affirmation, 
and define it as an individual’s belief that others recognize and acknowledge his or her 
positive characteristics. 
Perceived affirmation is deemed important for a number of reasons. First of all, 
people who believe that they matter to important others experience a sense of 
relatedness and certainty about their position with regard to these others (Mak & 
Marshall, 2004). In contrast, believing to be disrespected or even rejected can cause 
anxiety (Baumeister & Tice, 1990), and even depression (Coie, Terry, Zakriski, & 
Lochman, 1995). Second, literature in the domain of sociometer theory (Leary & 
Baumeister, 2000) has proposed and provided evidence that people’s belief that they 
are acknowledged by others positively affects their self-esteem (e.g., Denissen, Penke, 
Schmitt, & Van Aken, 2008). Third, research on pride has shown that people whose 




performance is publicly and positively evaluated are more persistent in obtaining their 
goals (Williams & DeSteno, 2008). Finally, economic research has found that social 
approval can increase voluntary helping and stimulate cooperation within a team 
(Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2009). In short, perceived affirmation is 
an important motivational force. 
There are several reasons why one would expect perceived affirmation to be 
especially important in work teams. Over the last decades, teams have become the 
building blocks of organizations and the most important groups employees belong to at 
work (Devine, Clayton, Philips, Dunford, & Melner, 1999). Because people’s tendency to 
strive for affirmation is especially strong in groups that are important to them (e.g., 
Bernstein, Sacco, Young, Cook, & Hugenberg, 2010), the present study focuses on 
perceived affirmation in work teams. A second reason for this focus is that teams are 
characterized by interdependence between its members for fulfilling tasks and reaching 
goals (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006), and people are particularly motivated to be viewed 
positively by people they depend on (see, for example, Stevens & Fiske, 2000). 
Perceived affirmation may refer to all kinds of individual qualities such as social 
skills, overall intelligence, creativity, and sport skills (Pelham & Swann, 1989). In the 
current study, we focus on perceived affirmation of expertise for two reasons. First, 
expertise –i.e. an individual’s extensive knowledge or ability based on research, 
experience, or occupation in a particular area of study (Ericsson, 1996) – is the most 
important cognitive resource of a team (Faraj & Sproull, 2000). That is, the basic idea 
behind the increasing use of work teams in organizations is that teams facilitate the 
combination and integration of the expertise of the individual members. As a result, 
teams may perform more complex tasks, find more creative solutions, and make better 
decisions than the same number of individual employees on their own (Faraj & Sproull, 
2000). As such, team members’ expertise tends to have a strong impact on task-related 
team processes (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999). Second, expertise is a positively 
valued individual characteristic that incorporates team members’ individual strengths, 
talents, and skills that not only determine their potential contribution to the collective 
team product but also part of their work identity (cf. Van der Vegt, Van de Vliert, & 
Oosterhof, 2003).  
We define perceived expertise affirmation as an individual team member’s belief 




expertise. Perceived expertise affirmation is an individual cognitive variable that may 
vary among individuals, just like other cognitive variables such as need for cognition 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), or self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977). That is, individual team 
members may differ in the extent to which they believe that fellow team members 
affirm their expertise. Research suggests that individual traits may partly determine 
how people think others see them. For example, individuals with a high level of global 
self-esteem tend to be more positive about how they think others see them in general 
(Back, Krause, Hirschmüller, Stopfer, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2009). Also, situational factors 
such as the frequency of interaction between team members may affect how individual 
team members believe others see them, and therefore result in intra-team differences in 
perceived expertise affirmation.  
The team-level construct: Reciprocal expertise affirmation 
  Even though perceived expertise affirmation originates as an individual team 
member’s belief (or, more precisely, as a meta-belief, i.e. someone’s perception of how 
others see him/her; Kenny, 1994), substantial differences in expertise affirmation 
beliefs can also emerge between teams as a whole. The most important reason is that, 
just like individuals, teams vary on a number of characteristics that may result in inter-
team differences in collective beliefs. Research has shown that a team’s collective belief 
is the result of members’ common exposure to similar situations, and prior performance 
(Bandura, 1993) as well as comparisons and discussions about team outcomes 
(Lindsley, Brass, & Thomas, 1995). For example, teams may differ in how often they 
engage in team activities such as team meetings, discussions, or lunches together. Such 
team activities enable members to display their abilities, skills, and knowledge in front 
of the rest of the team, and to observe fellow members’ behavior and performance in 
different settings. Since research suggests that deep-level information (such as 
expertise) only becomes available over time through verbal and non-verbal interaction 
(cf. Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998), it is likely that teams that spend more time on joint 
team activities develop higher levels of perceived expertise affirmation than teams that 
rarely engage in such activities.    
  We follow MacPhail et al. (2009), and refer to this team-level concept as 
reciprocal expertise affirmation. Reciprocal expertise affirmation is defined as team 
members’ collective belief that their expertise is recognized and acknowledged by their 
fellow team members. Thus, whereas perceived expertise affirmation is an individual 




belief about the extent to which fellow members recognize and acknowledge one’s 
expertise, reciprocal expertise affirmation refers to a team’s collective belief with the 
same content. The criteria that have to be met before one can speak about a collective 
belief will be discussed later (cf. Dansereau & Yammarino, 2000). For now, we simply 
want to make the point that it is likely that within teams collective expertise affirmation 
beliefs may evolve because individuals interact and start to converge in their 
perceptions, resulting in differences between teams.  
  Based on the above, we argue that perceived expertise affirmation and reciprocal 
expertise affirmation are two distinct constructs and that differences in expertise 
affirmation beliefs may exist both within teams and between teams. We now continue 
with discussing the emergence of reciprocal expertise affirmation to the team level from 
the individual measure of perceived expertise affirmation.  
Step 2: Articulation of the nature of the aggregate construct. 
We conceive perceived expertise affirmation as a one-dimensional concept that 
can be measured in a straightforward way by asking team members questions such as 
“The other team members know in detail what I know and what I am capable of”. We 
assess reciprocal expertise affirmation with the same scale, but aggregated to the team 
level of analysis because, except for the level of analysis, both constructs derive from 
individual team members’ expertise affirmation beliefs. In more statistical terms, we 
use a consensus model (Chen et al., 2004) to operationalize reciprocal expertise 
affirmation. This is the most common type of aggregation in organizational research and 
consists of calculating the team mean of the individual team members’ ratings. 
Preconditions for using this aggregate in order to represent a collective belief are 
sufficient agreement between the team members with regard to expertise affirmation 
beliefs, as well as significant between-team variance (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984; 
Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). These preconditions will be tested and reported in the results 
section. However, before reporting the empirical evidence, we start with discussing 
steps 3 through 5 of Chen’s (2004) framework of multi-level construct validation.  
Step 3: Psychometric properties of the construct across levels of analysis 
 Step 3 is devoted to the factor structure, agreement, and reliability of the 
proposed construct. The required tests differ depending on the type of construct under 





First, the factor structure of the multi-level construct should be identical across 
levels of analysis and correspond to the anticipated number of dimensions (Chen et al., 
2004). Because we conceptualized perceived expertise affirmation as a one-dimensional 
cognitive construct at both the individual and team levels of analysis, it is sufficient to 
demonstrate this one-dimensionality at both levels of analysis with separate factor 
analyses (cf. Chen et al., 2004).  
 Second, if one adopts a consensus model to operationalize a team-level construct, 
it is crucial to examine whether individual perceptions converge within teams. The most 
common way to do that is by calculating the inter-rater agreement index (Rwg) 
developed by James et al. (1984). This measure indicates whether the variability of 
members’ responses within a team is smaller (more agreement) than one would expect 
by chance alone. The value for the aggregate construct should be equal to .70 or higher 
in order to justify aggregation of the individual ratings to represent a team-level 
construct (cf. James et al., 1984). 
Third, the reliability of the measure needs to be adequate at both the individual 
and the team levels of analysis. In the case of a consensus model, it is important to note 
that the internal consistencies may differ depending on the inter-correlation matrices 
used. That is, in our case, one should not only compute Cronbach’s alpha for the scale at 
the individual level of analysis, but also at the team level of analysis. Moreover, all 
internal consistency values should exceed the .70 threshold that Hinkin (1998) has 
recommended for a new measure (p. 113). The empirical results for the factor, Rwg, and 
reliability analyses for the scale we developed will be reported in the results section.  
Step 4: Construct variability across levels of analysis 
 The purpose of the fourth step of the validation process is to ensure that the 
measures of the multi-level construct vary sufficiently within and between units of 
analysis (in our case work teams). The most commonly used indices to examine this are 
intra-class correlations (ICCs; cf. Dansereau & Yammarino, 2000). ICC(1) indicates 
which proportion of the variance in individuals’ scores is accounted for by team 
membership, or the degree to which within-team variance is small relative to the 
between-teams variance. ICC(2) is a figure that evaluates the reliability of the group 
means (Bliese, 2000). We report these scores for our focal construct in the results 
section. 
  




Step 5: Construct function across levels of analysis 
Chen et al. (2004) argue that the best way to clarify the meaning of a multi-level 
construct is by discussing and examining its differences and similarities with other 
constructs at the relevant levels of analysis. In the present chapter, we aim to provide 
some initial content validation, and compare our focal construct to two related but 
distinct concepts at each level of analyses. Later, in the results section, we present the 
corresponding empirical results. At the individual level of analysis we contrast 
perceived expertise affirmation to self-efficacy and team-based self-esteem. At the team 
level of analysis, we compare reciprocal expertise affirmation to psychological safety 
and credibility. 
Perceived expertise affirmation and related constructs 
We chose self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977), and team-based self-esteem (Ellemers, 
Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999) because, just like perceived expertise affirmation, self-
efficacy and team-based self-esteem are both individual-level cognitive constructs with 
positive motivating potential (Bandura, 1977; Ellemers et al., 1999). Self-efficacy refers 
to people’s belief in their individual ability to succeed in specific situations or to fulfill 
specific tasks (Bandura, 1977), and can be considered as a person’s expectation of his or 
her chances to successfully accomplish a given task. It is generally seen as an 
individual’s belief in his or her capability to perform a specific task at a specific level of 
performance.  
 Similar to perceived expertise affirmation, self-efficacy is task-related, and 
concerned with someone’s skills, abilities, and knowledge. Because self-efficacy is 
someone’s judgment of whether or not s/he is capable to perform a certain task, it has a 
rather inward-focused orientation (toward oneself and the task). This means that even 
if someone would be alone in the world, this individual could still have a belief about 
how capable s/he is at performing a certain task (e.g., “I am able to build this fence”).  
 In contrast to self-efficacy, perceived expertise affirmation has a more outward 
orientation. That is, perceived expertise affirmation is not a belief about one’s own 
capabilities to do something, but about how one believes to be seen by others (e.g., “I 
think others think I can build this fence”). This presupposes the existence of and contact 
with others. Moreover, self-efficacy and perceived expertise affirmation can vary 
independently. For example, John may think that he is very competent at fulfilling the 




fellow team members from the front-office is aware of this expertise (low perceived 
expertise affirmation). In short, self-efficacy is concerned with how John evaluates his 
own expertise, whereas perceived expertise affirmation focuses on how John thinks 
others evaluate his expertise.  
We expect both self-efficacy and perceived expertise affirmation to be 
motivational forces, albeit through different mechanism. According to Bandura (1993), 
self-efficacy affects the levels at which people set their goals, the strength of their 
commitment to them, and the strategies people use to obtain them. From research on 
goal setting, it is known that these factors increase intrinsic motivation (Locke & 
Latham, 1990). Also, self-efficacy has been shown to directly enhance task performance 
which, in itself, can function as a motivator (Lindsley et al., 1995; Sadri & Robertson, 
1993). In contrast to self-efficacy, the expected motivational force behind perceived 
expertise affirmation is not based on goal-setting mechanisms but is rather of a social 
nature. That is, perceived expertise affirmation signals to team members that they are 
respected by the other members of the team (cf. Tyler & Blader, 2003), fulfilling a 
fundamental need to feel estimated and recognized by important others (e.g., Herzberg 
et al., 1959; Maslow, 1943). Because of the strong motivational force of psychological 
need satisfaction (cf. the self-determination literature; Baard, Deci, & Ryan, 2004), we 
expect that perceived expertise affirmation will motivate people through this social 
mechanism.  
Team-based self-esteem is directly derived from the construct of organization-
based self-esteem, which refers to the degree to which an individual believes 
him/herself to be capable, significant, and worthy as an organizational member (Pierce 
& Gardner, 2004). In contrast to organization-based self-esteem, team-based self-
esteem is focused on team instead of organizational membership. Team-based self-
esteem thus reflects the extent to which an individual thinks he or she is capable, 
significant, and worthy as a team member. 
Similar to perceived expertise affirmation, team-based self-esteem refers to an 
evaluation of one’s value derived from an aspect of their social identity (e.g., Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986). In this case, it is that part of a team member’s social identity that derives 
from the value connotation attached to the membership of this particular team 
(Ellemers et al., 1999) (e.g., “I really matter in this team”).  




In contrast to perceived expertise affirmation, team-based self-esteem is not 
necessarily task-related, but broader and may be related to all kinds of aspects. For 
example, John can have little task expertise, but may still feel that he is very important 
for the team because he is able to create a good atmosphere within the team because of 
his great sense of humor. Irrespective of his expertise, he may, therefore, think he fulfills 
an important role within the team, and, as a result, score high on team-based self-
esteem.  
A second difference is that team-based self-esteem regards someone’s self-
evaluation (Pierce & Gardner, 2004), whereas perceived expertise affirmation is 
someone’s belief about how others evaluate him or her. Finally, perceived expertise 
affirmation is more cognitive in nature (“I think others have an accurate view of what I 
know”) while team-based self-esteem is more affective in nature (“I really feel that I fit 
well in this team”). Because of these differences, perceived expertise affirmation and 
team-based self-esteem may vary independently. That is, Sarah may think their fellow 
members are unaware of her expertise, but at the same time may feel that she fulfills an 
important role in her team. 
Similar to perceived expertise affirmation and self-efficacy, team-based self-
esteem also has a potential motivational effect on team members. For example, research 
has shown that people who score high on organization-based self-esteem tend to show 
high levels of commitment, like their work, and perform well (see Pierce & Gardner 
[2004] for an overview). Because a team is the most important group employees belong 
to at work, one would expect the same, or even stronger results for team-based self-
esteem. Second, the social identity literature argues that team-based self-esteem makes 
team members feel more included and, in turn, more inclined to work hard for their 
team (see Ellemers et al., 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In short, the motivational 
mechanism of perceived expertise affirmation seems more similar to that of team-based 
self-esteem than that of self-efficacy in the sense that it is more of a social nature than 
related to goal setting.   
Reciprocal expertise affirmation and related constructs  
At the team level of analysis, we relate reciprocal expertise affirmation to 
psychological safety and credibility because, similar to reciprocal expertise affirmation, 
these are both team-level collective beliefs that have been related to effective team 




Psychological safety is defined as a collective belief among team members that 
they will not be harmed if they make or report mistakes, ask for advice or seek feedback 
(Edmondson, 1999). It refers to how team members think fellow members will react if 
they act visibly within the team (e.g., asking a question or proposing a new idea in a 
meeting). Similar to reciprocal expertise affirmation, psychological safety is a collective 
belief that may differ between teams. That is, over time, team members start to 
converge in their perceptions and develop shared beliefs about how things are in their 
team. For example, asking feedback about a medical mistake might be unthinkable in 
one surgical team but considered normal behavior in another team due to the 
differences between those teams in their beliefs about probable interpersonal 
consequences (cf. Edmondson, 1999). 
Reciprocal expertise affirmation and psychological safety differ with regard to 
the content of the collective belief. First, reciprocal expertise affirmation is focused on 
the evaluation of an individual characteristic (expertise), whereas psychological safety 
focuses on the evaluation of the acceptability of specific behavior in this team (e.g., 
asking for help, admitting errors, seeking feedback; Edmondson, 1999). Second, in 
contrast to reciprocal expertise affirmation, psychological safety regards beliefs about 
the absence or presence of fear which represents a strong, negative emotion (Öhman, 
2000). Third, psychological safety is more avoidance-oriented (i.e. focused on protecting 
oneself from harm), whereas perceived expertise affirmation is more approach-oriented 
(i.e. focused on obtaining approval or respect from others).  
As a result, reciprocal expertise affirmation and psychological safety can differ 
independently. Team members may believe that they can express themselves within 
their team without any repercussions (high level of psychological safety), but at the 
same time believe that fellow members are not aware of their expertise (low level of 
reciprocal expertise affirmation). The opposite is also possible. For example, team 
members may think that their expertise is recognized and acknowledged by the team 
(high level of reciprocal expertise affirmation), but also believe that, as soon as they 
make a mistake this will be held against them (low level of psychological safety).  
Both psychological safety and reciprocal expertise affirmation have been 
identified as motivators for team members to share and integrate their expertise with 
their fellow members, and, therefore, have been related to team performance 
(Edmondson, 1999; MacPhail et al., 2009). However, the underlying motivating drivers 




are likely to differ because approach and avoidance forms of motivational regulation 
activate diametrically divergent sets of intrinsic motivation processes (cf. Elliott & 
Harackiewicz, 1996). Approach goals, such as striving for affirmation, tend to generate 
excitement whereas avoidance goals, such as not making mistakes, trigger inhibition 
(Elliott & Harackiewicz, 1996). We would expect that reciprocal expertise affirmation 
creates an approach orientation and activates knowledge sharing and integration, as 
well as team learning. In contrast, psychological safety reduces team members’ 
avoidance to discuss their mistakes or creative ideas within the team. For these reasons 
we expect both psychological safety and reciprocal expertise affirmation to increase 
team performance, but for different reasons (less inhibition versus more activation, 
respectively).  
Credibility is a component of a team’s transactive memory (i.e. a cognitive system 
that combines the knowledge possessed by each individual with a shared and accurate 
awareness of who knows what; Wegner, 1986). Credibility reflects the extent to which 
the team members believe that the relevant task knowledge possessed by any of the 
other team members is correct (Lewis, 2003). In sum, credibility is the extent to which 
team members have confidence in each other’s expertise and relevant task knowledge. 
Similar to reciprocal expertise affirmation, credibility is a collective belief that 
focuses on team members’ expertise. However, while reciprocal expertise affirmation 
refers to team members’ beliefs about how their expertise is evaluated by their fellow 
team members (meta-perception), credibility refers to how team members evaluate 
their fellow team members’ expertise (perception). As a result, they can vary 
independently. For example, within a team everyone may believe that fellow members 
affirm their expertise (high level of reciprocal expertise affirmation), whereas in reality 
team members do not trust the expertise of the other members at all (low level of 
credibility). The other way around is also possible, that is, team members may have a 
collective belief that their expertise is not affirmed (low level of reciprocal expertise 
affirmation), while in reality everyone relies without hesitance on the expertise and 
information of their fellow members (high level of credibility).  
Even though reciprocal expertise affirmation and credibility have both been 
theoretically related to team performance, the mechanisms through which they are 
expected to increase team performance differ. MacPhail et al. (2009) argue that 




expertise with their fellow members, which increases team performance. On the other 
hand, the literature relates the effects of credibility more to a clearer division of labor 
than to increases in motivation (cf. Lewis, 2003; Wegner, 1986). That is, if team 
members believe that the task knowledge from their fellow team members is credible 
this allows them to focus on their own task with fewer distractions, and without the 
need to double check information and work from others. This may lead to higher levels 
of efficiency and, as a result, increased levels of individual and team task performance 
(Wegner, 1986).  
Before we continue with the empirical tests required in steps 3 through 5, we 
describe the sample, procedure, and measures we used to collect the data on which we 
ran our empirical validation analyses. 
Method 
Sample and data collection procedures 
 In order to validate our measures of perceived expertise affirmation and 
reciprocal expertise affirmation, we conducted a survey study in a sample of 155 white-
collar employees from organizations in The Netherlands from a wide variety of industry 
sectors. Of these employees 22% worked in the health sector, 18.5% worked for 
financial institutions, 18.5% for the government, 11% in education, 7% in retail, 7% in 
the construction industry, 7% in service organizations, 4% in culture, and 4% in 
transport.  
 During a meeting with the supervisors of the participating teams, we collected 
general information, such as team size and the type of work performed by the teams. 
Two weeks later we distributed a survey among all the team members in which we 
asked questions related to our study variables. We distributed and gathered all 
questionnaires in person in order to obtain a good response rate. In addition, we 
explained that the data would be treated confidentially.  
Out of the initial 164 team members, 155 respondents returned the survey (a 
94.5% response rate). Team members’ ages ranged from 17 to 72 (M=39, SD=12.56). 
Their average number of months in their organization, position, and team were 130, 94, 
and 49, respectively. Of the 155 respondents, 52 % were male. The size of the 27 teams 
in our sample ranged from 4 to 11 (M=6.07, SD=1.88). In 18 of these returned 
questionnaires there were missing values, resulting in a complete dataset for 137 
respondents. 




Individual-level measures  
 Perceived expertise affirmation. Because an instrument to assess perceived 
expertise affirmation did not yet exist we had to develop a new scale. In order to create 
a valid measure of a construct it is important to start with a clear and precise 
conceptualization of the construct and its theoretical context, as we did above. For the 
development of our initial item pool we used Kenny’s (1994) work about meta-
perception as a theoretical basis. Next, we spent ample time on developing items that 
reflect expertise affirmation beliefs. The initial item pool consisted of six items, which 
we consider sufficient given the narrow and specific content area of our core construct. 
These six items read: “The other team members are aware of my team-relevant skills”, 
“The other team members are aware of my capabilities”, “The other team members have 
an accurate view of my capabilities”, “The other team members are aware of my team-
relevant knowledge”, “The other team members are aware of what I know”, and “The 
other team members have detailed knowledge about my knowledge and capabilities”. 
For the next step in the scale development process, Chen et al. (2004) 
recommend using subject matter experts to verify whether these items sufficiently and 
accurately capture the intended construct. Five subject matter experts independently 
judged the items on their face validity and their content validity. Based on their 
comments, the two items “The other team members are aware of my team-relevant 
skills” and “The other team members are aware of my capabilities” were rephrased into 
one new item as follows, “The other team members are precisely aware of my 
knowledge and expertise”. Also, the two items: “The other team members are aware of 
my team-relevant knowledge”, and “The other team members are aware of what I 
know”, were rephrased and combined in one item: “The other team members have an 
accurate view of what I know”. 
In a second round the same five subject matter experts reached consensus on 
using the following three items as indicators of perceived expertise affirmation. “The 
other team members are precisely aware of my knowledge and expertise”, “The other 
team members know in detail what I know and what I am capable of”, and “The other 
team members have an accurate view of what I know”. Therefore, these three items 
were put in the questionnaire to assess team members’ expertise affirmation beliefs. We 




(“completely agree”) for all scales. Reliability and factor structure details for this scale 
are presented in the results section. 
Self-efficacy. We measured self-efficacy with three items from Spreitzer (1995): 
“I am confident about my ability to do my job”, “I am self-assured about my capabilities 
to perform my work”, and “I have mastered the skills necessary for my job”. Cronbach’s 
alpha for this scale was .89.  
Team-based self-esteem. We measured team-based self-esteem with four items 
adapted from Ellemers et al. (1999): “I really feel that I fit well in this team”, “The other 
team members have faith in my competence”, “I really matter in this team”, and “I am 
generally satisfied about my role in this team”. Because of the conceptual overlap of the 
item “The other team members have faith in my competence” with perceived expertise 
affirmation we ran all analyses twice, once with and once without this item. Excluding 
this item from the team-based self-esteem scale decreased the Cronbach’s alpha from 
.88 to .86. 
Team-level measures 
Reciprocal expertise affirmation. Reciprocal expertise affirmation was measured 
with the same scale as perceived expertise affirmation and subsequently aggregated to 
the team level of analysis. Reliability, factor structure, and aggregation details for this 
scale are presented in the results section. 
Credibility. Credibility was measured using four items from Lewis (2003). The 
items were: “The members of this team trust that other members’ knowledge is 
credible”, “The members of this team confidently rely on the information other people 
bring into the discussion”, “When other team members give information, I want to 
double-check it for myself” (reversed), and “The members of this team do not have 
much faith in other members’ expertise” (reversed). The team-level Cronbach’s alpha of 
this scale was .86. The mean Rwg value for credibility was .87 (James et al., 1984). 
Further, one-way analyses of variance showed that perceptions of credibility differed 
significantly between teams. F(26, 110)=2.51, p<.01). The ICC(1) value of .21 indicated 
that a significant proportion of the total variance was accounted for by team 
membership. ICC(2) was .60. Together, these statistics suggested that aggregating 
individual perceptions of credibility to reflect team-level credibility was justified.  
Psychological safety. Psychological safety was measured using the seven-item 
scale from Edmondson (1999). The items read as follows “If you make a mistake in this 




team, it is often held against you” (reversed), “Members of this team are able to bring up 
problems and tough issues”, “People on this team sometimes reject others for being 
different”(reversed), “It is safe to take a risk on this team”, “It is difficult to ask other 
members of this team for help”(reversed), “No one on this team would deliberately act 
in a way that undermines my efforts”, and “Working with members of this team, means 
that my unique skills and talents are valued and utilized”. However, because of the 
conceptual overlap of the latter psychological safety item and the three expertise 
affirmation items, we ran all analyses twice, once with and once without this item. 
Excluding this item from the scale reduced the team-level Cronbach’s alpha from .75 to 
.72. The mean Rwg value (James et al., 1984) for psychological safety was .79, and, one-
way analyses of variance showed that perceptions of psychological safety differed 
significantly between teams F(26, 110)=3.20, p<.01). The ICC(1) value of .28 indicated 
that a significant proportion of the total variance was accounted for by team 
membership. ICC(2) was .69. After excluding the item the results remained similar, that 
is, (F(26, 110)=3.10, p<.01). ICC(1)=27; ICC(2)=.68, and showed that with or without 
this item, aggregation of psychological safety to the team level of analysis was allowed.  
Results 
Psychometric properties of the construct across levels of analysis 
 In step 3, using the above-mentioned data, we examined the factor structure, 
reliability, and inter-member agreement of our perceived expertise affirmation and 
reciprocal expertise affirmation measures. 
Factor structure  
In order to test the convergent validity of the three items at both levels of 
analysis and to establish the structural equivalence between the two constructs, we 
performed a multi-level factor analysis. We deliberately chose to do a multi-level factor 
analysis, because we used the same items to assess the construct at multiple levels of 
analysis (cf. Chen et al., 2004). We conducted exploratory rather than confirmatory 
multi-level factor analyses because we were interested in the identification of the 
underlying factor structure without any a priori restrictions. To that end, we followed 
the procedure outlined by Van de Vijver and Poortinga (2001) and ran two separate 
exploratory factor analyses. The first exploratory factor analysis was at the individual 
level of analysis and was performed using the team mean-centered individual scores, 




means (cf. Van de Vijver & Poortinga, 2001). The results of these exploratory factor 
analyses are presented in Table 2.1.  
As expected, only one component was extracted at both levels of analysis, and 
each item showed very high factor loadings. The percentage of explained variance by 
this factor was 81.54% at the individual level of analysis and 89.91% at the team level of 
analysis. These results provide evidence for the one-dimensionality of the construct. 
Finally, we evaluated the factorial agreement of the pooled-within structure and the 
pooled-between structure by calculating a congruence coefficient, Kendall’s tau, 
between the individual and group-level factor loadings. This correspondence measure 
among the individual and group-level factor was 1 (p<.01), showing that, as required for 
this type of multi-level construct, the one-factor structure was invariant across both 
levels of analysis (Van de Vijver & Poortinga, 2002).  
 
Table 2.1 
Results of exploratory multi-level factor analysis of perceived and reciprocal expertise 
affirmation: Loadings at the individual (within) and team (between) levels. 
 
Reliability and inter-member agreement 
The internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) was .85 for the perceived 
expertise affirmation scale and .94 for the team-level reciprocal expertise affirmation 
scale. Both are well above the .70 threshold that Hinkin (1998) has recommended for a 
        Factor loadings 
Items        Within  Between 
1 The other team members are precisely aware of my knowledge and expertise .91 .95 
2 The other team members know in detail what I know and what I am capable of .88 .93 
3 The other team members have an accurate view of what I know .92 .96 
   
% explained variance     81.54      89.91 
Eigen value        2.45        2.70 




new measure (p. 113). The mean Rwg value for reciprocal expertise affirmation was .75 
(James et al., 1984) which showed sufficient within-team agreement.  
Construct variability across levels of analysis 
Step 4 of the validation process is to ensure that measures of the multi-level 
construct vary appropriately at both levels of analysis. A one-way analysis of variance 
showed that expertise affirmation beliefs differed significantly between teams, F(26, 
110)=1.69, p <.05). The ICC(1) value of .12 indicated that a significant proportion of the 
total variance was accounted for by team membership. ICC(2) was .41. Even though 
these statistics suggested that aggregating individual perceived expertise affirmation to 
reflect team-level reciprocal expertise affirmation was justified (cf. Bliese, 2000), the 
mean squares reveal that there was not only an important amount of variance between 
the teams (MS=.74) but also within the teams (MS=.44). This suggests that it is not only 
theoretically but also empirically meaningful to distinguish between reciprocal 
expertise affirmation and perceived expertise affirmation.  
Construct function across levels of analysis  
Individual-level confirmatory factor analysis 
Table 2.2 presents the inter-item correlations of the three individual-level 
constructs under scrutiny. Normally, correlations at the individual level of analysis need 
to be interpreted with caution when working with nested data (individuals within 
teams [cf. Snijders & Bosker, 1999]). In order to take into account this nesting, we used 
the WABA-procedure from Dansereau & Yammarino (2000) that Chen et al. (2004) 
recommend, and subtracted the team means from the individual scores before 
calculating the individual-level inter-correlations. 
From Table 2.2 it can be seen that the items of self-efficacy and perceived 
expertise affirmation were most highly correlated to items from their own respective 
scales, but that this was not the case for the item “The other team members have faith in 
my competence” from the team-based self-esteem scale (see item TBSE2 in Table 2.2). 
As expected, this item was highly correlated with the three perceived expertise 
affirmation items. Because of this conceptual overlap and the high inter-correlations 




analyses1. Even though there was also some conceptual overlap between the team-
based self-esteem item “I really matter to this team” (item TBSE3 in Table 2.2) and the 
perceived expertise affirmation items, this item does not specifically refer to expertise. 
Moreover, the inter-correlations were smaller than those of the item mentioned above. 
Therefore, we decided not to exclude this item from the scale.  
We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to assess the discriminant and 
convergent validity of the items measuring self-efficacy, perceived expertise affirmation, 
and team-based self-esteem with the LISREL 8.80 computer package, using the 
maximum likelihood method. Because for the individual-level constructs we were only 
interested in the within-team variance, we subtracted the team means from the 
individual team members’ scores to remove the between-team variance (cf. Van de 
Vijver & Poortinga, 2002). We, first, tested our hypothesized model in which self-
efficacy, perceived expertise affirmation, and team-based self-esteem items loaded on 
three corresponding latent constructs. The overall fit of the model to the data was good 
(χ2=40.22, df=24, p=.02). The comparative fit index (CFI) was .98, the Tucker-Lewis 
index (TLI) was .96, and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) was .07. 
Moreover, the factor loading of each item with its corresponding latent construct was 
significant at the .05 level or better. 
Next, we computed three alternative models. In the first alternative model, the 
team-based self-esteem, and perceived expertise affirmation items loaded all on one 
latent construct, and the self-efficacy items loaded on a separate latent construct. The fit 
of this model was significantly worse than that of the hypothesized measurement model 
(Δχ² (2)=113.70, p<.001), and fit indices for this model were less adequate (CFI=.87; 
TLI=.82; RMSEA=.19). In the second alternative model, all self-efficacy and perceived 
expertise affirmation items loaded on one latent construct, and team-based self-esteem 
items loaded on a separate latent construct. The fit of this model was so bad that the 
model did not even converge. The third alternative model contained only one latent 
variable. Again, the fit of this model was significantly worse than that of the original 
model (Δχ² [3]=281.10, p<.0001; CFI=.69; TLI=.58; RMSEA=.28).  
In sum, based on these outcomes we concluded that, as predicted, the 
hypothesized three- factor measurement model was the most appropriate for the data 
                                                 
1 The results for both the individual as well as the team-level CFA with the original scales were highly similar to 
those with the excluded items, and lead to the same conclusions regarding the validity of our focal constructs. 
Details can be obtained from the author. 




under consideration, providing evidence that perceived expertise affirmation, self-
efficacy, and team-based self-esteem are related but distinct constructs.  
This conclusion is consistent with the pattern of inter-correlations presented in Table 
2.3. Table 2.3 displays the means, standard deviations (SD), and zero-order Pearson 
correlations among all the study variables at the individual as well as the team level of 
analysis. As expected, at the individual level of analysis perceived expertise affirmation 
was moderately and positively related to both self-efficacy (r=.42, p <.01), and team-
based self-esteem (r=.54, p<.01). The correlation between self-efficacy and team-based 
self-esteem was also positive, but somewhat lower (r=.35, p <.01). 
Team-level confirmatory factor analysis  
Table 2.4 presents the inter-item Pearson correlations between the three team-
level constructs under scrutiny. From Table 2.4 it can be seen that the items of 
credibility and reciprocal expertise affirmation were most highly correlated to items 
from their own respective scales, but that this was not the case for the item “Working 
with members of this team, means that my unique skills and talents are valued and 
utilized” from the psychological safety scale. As expected, this item was highly 
correlated with the three expertise affirmation items (see item PS7 in Table 2.4). 
Because of this conceptual overlap, and the high inter-correlations with the items of 
reciprocal expertise affirmation, we excluded this item from all further analyses.  
We conducted a second confirmatory factor analysis to assess the discriminant 
and convergent validity of credibility, psychological safety, and reciprocal expertise 
affirmation. Although the sample size at the team level of analysis was relatively small, a 
simulation study from Gagné & Hancock (2006) regarding CFA and sample size has 
shown that if the model converges and the construct reliabilities are high, estimates are 
very likely to be reliable.  
We first tested our hypothesized model in which the credibility, psychological 
safety, and reciprocal expertise affirmation items loaded on three corresponding latent 
constructs. The overall fit of this model to the data was reasonable (χ2=75.17, df=62, 
n.s.; CFI=.89; TLI=.86; RMSEA=.09). Moreover, the factor loadings of the items of 
reciprocal expertise affirmation and credibility with their corresponding latent 
construct were all significant at the .05 level or better. However, this was not the case 
for three psychological safety items “If you make a mistake in this team, it is often held 




different” (reversed), and “No one on this team would deliberately act in a way that 
undermines my efforts” (items PS1, PS3, and PS6, respectively, in Table 2.4). We will 
come back to this point in the discussion section. 
To further evaluate the discriminant validity of our scales we computed three 
alternative models. In the first model, all credibility and reciprocal expertise affirmation 
items loaded on one latent construct and the psychological safety items loaded on a 
separate latent construct. The fit of this model was significantly worse than that of the 
hypothesized measurement model (Δχ² [2]=65.31, p<.001). Fit indices for this model 
were CFI=.77; TLI=.72; RMSEA=.21. In the second model, all psychological safety items 
and reciprocal expertise affirmation items loaded on one latent construct, and 
credibility loaded on a separate latent construct. The fit of this model was also 
significantly worse than that of the hypothesized measurement model (Δχ² [2]=53.17, p 
<.001; CFI=.76; TLI=.71; RMSEA=.20). The third model contained only one latent 
variable. Again, the fit of this model was significantly worse than that of the original 
model (Δχ²[3]=57.07, p<.001; CFI=.70; TLI=.64; RMSEA=.20).  
In short, based on these outcomes we conclude that, as expected, our three-factor 
measurement model was the most appropriate for the data under consideration, 
providing evidence that reciprocal expertise affirmation, psychological safety, and 
credibility are related but distinct constructs.  
This is also consistent with the inter-correlations between the team-level 
variables (see Table 2.3). At the team level of analysis reciprocal expertise affirmation is 
positively related to credibility (r=.51, p<.01) but not significantly to psychological 
safety (r=.26, n.s.). Moreover, psychological safety and credibility are highly and 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In spite of the fact that perceived expertise affirmation has been identified as a 
strong motivational force in teams (MacPhail et al., 2009) research on this construct is 
scarce. The aim of the present chapter was to take a first step in the conceptualization 
and empirical validation of this construct. Using Chen et al.’s (2004) framework for 
multi-level construct validation, our results showed that, as expected, the individual 
team members’ perceptions of expertise affirmation materialize into a team-level 
property, which we refer to as reciprocal expertise affirmation (MacPhail et al., 2009). 
Moreover, in this chapter, we provided evidence that perceived expertise affirmation 
and reciprocal expertise affirmation are unique constructs that can be theoretically and 
empirically distinguished from seemingly related constructs at the individual and team 
levels of analysis.  
Theoretical implications  
The findings in this chapter make two important contributions to the teamwork 
literature. First, this study answers calls from MacPhail et al. (2009) and other scholars 
for research into affirmation of important positive characteristics of people’s identity at 
work (see, for example, also, Dutton, Roberts, & Bednar, 2010). This stream of research 
builds on fundamental social psychological work that underscores the importance of the 
construction and maintenance of a positive identity at work and its potential 
implications for motivation. The first step in setting up research in a specific domain is 
to make it measurable. In this study, we have developed and validated a scale that may 
stimulate research examining the importance of perceived expertise affirmation at 
work.  
Second, the study in this chapter responds to recent calls for a multi-level 
approach to the study of identities at work (Ashforth, Rogers, & Corley, 2011). Most 
research on organization-based identities focuses on a single level of analysis, typically 
the individual, group, or organizational-level, whereas in order to truly understand the 
organization as a system of interacting identities, it must be examined at all relevant 
levels of analysis (Ashforth et al., 2011; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). This study showed 
that for expertise affirmation beliefs at least two levels of analysis matter: the individual 
and the team level of analysis. Not only do individual employees differ in the extent to 
which they believe others acknowledge positive aspects of their identity such as 
expertise (perceived expertise affirmation), these individual beliefs also convert into a 




team-level construct (reciprocal expertise affirmation). In order to reap the potential 
benefits of perceived/reciprocal expertise affirmation for team work, it is important to 
gain more detailed knowledge regarding their development and effects at both levels of 
analysis. Explicitly distinguishing between the individual and the team level can 
function as a starting point for theory and studies to further our knowledge of the 
importance of positive identities for team work. This study is a first step in that 
direction.  
Limitations and suggestions for future research 
The current study’s contributions should be interpreted in light of its limitations. 
One issue that warrants discussion is the small sample size at the team level of analysis. 
The simulation study from Gagné and Hancock (2006) has shown that model 
convergence and construct reliabilities are of much more importance than sample size 
for reliable results in a confirmatory factor analysis. In spite of the fact that these 
authors have shown that if the model converges and constructs reliabilities are high, as 
in our case, estimates are very likely to be reliable, we recommend future research to 
replicate our findings in a larger sample.   
We used a consensus model to aggregate our focal construct to the team level of 
analysis (Chen et al., 2004). This means that we assessed reciprocal expertise 
affirmation with the same scale as its individual-level counterpart, and that the referent 
remained the same at both levels of analysis (i.e. “I”). In spite of the fact that this is the 
most common type of aggregation in organizational research and there are sufficient 
statistical preconditions to ensure agreement between the team members before using 
this aggregate in order to represent a collective belief (James, et al., 1984; Kozlowski & 
Klein, 2000), using a referent-shift model would also be an interesting option. In the 
latter case, the operationalization of the construct would remain the same at the 
individual level of analysis (e.g., “The other team members know in detail what I know 
and what I am capable of”). However, at the team level of analysis the referent of the 
items would change to “we” or the “team” (e.g., “Within this team, members can be sure 
that their expertise and capabilities are known by their fellow members”). In order to 
further develop the scale to measure expertise affirmation beliefs, it would be 
interesting to contrast and compare these two team-level constructs in future research.  
Due to the conceptual overlap and high correlations with our expertise 




other team members have faith in my competence”) and psychological safety (“Working 
with members of this team, means that my unique skills and talents are valued and 
utilized”), respectively. Running all our analyses twice showed that the pattern of the 
results was the same with and without these items. That is, as we predicted, the solution 
with three latent constructs was a better fit to the data than a two- or one-factor 
solution at both the individual as well as the team level of analysis. With regard to the 
psychological safety scale, MacPhail et al. (2009) already discussed the importance of 
conceptual clarity between psychological safety and reciprocal expertise affirmation. 
Moreover, we are not the first to experience problems with this scale. For example, Baer 
and Frese (2003) reported omitting an item from the confirmatory factor analysis 
because participants did not seem to understand it correctly. Future research might 
take a closer look at the operationalization of psychological safety and team-based self-
esteem, and rephrase some items in order to obtain higher levels of convergent and 
divergent validity.  
Even though four key variables were addressed in relation to our focal construct, 
a more comprehensive nomological network should be examined in future research. 
Because research on expertise affirmation beliefs is still in its infancy, further efforts at 
construct validation should explore hypotheses concerning key antecedents and 
consequences of the construct (Chen et al., 2004). For example, one could expect that 
high-performing team members may have higher levels of perceived expertise 
affirmation than low-performers. At the team level, size may be an important 
antecedent because members are more visible in a small team than in a large team. 
Therefore, smaller teams may develop higher levels of reciprocal expertise than larger 
teams. 
With regard to the consequences of expertise affirmation beliefs, there is little 
empirical evidence (MacPhail et al., 2009). It would, therefore, be interesting for future 
research to examine their effects on performance at each relevant level of analysis. For 
example, one might expect that perceived expertise affirmation predicts individual team 
members’ motivation and performance, and that the team-level construct of reciprocal 
expertise affirmation adds to this prediction over and above the individual-level effect. 
Also, the expected positive effects of reciprocal expertise affirmation for team 
performance may be less straightforward than at the individual level. Even if high levels 
of reciprocal expertise affirmation within a team would increase motivation and 




performance of the team members, this does not necessarily directly increase team 
performance. That is, high levels of team performance require the coordination of team 
members’ individual efforts (cf. Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006). This would suggest that the 
effects of reciprocal expertise affirmation on team performance may depend on team 
coordination mechanisms (e.g., Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). In future research it 
would be interesting to explore these effects at both the individual as well as the team 
level of analysis. 
Because in this study we were only interested in the convergent and divergent 
validity of our focal construct and a number of related yet distinct constructs, we did not 
address the directionality of the relationship between the constructs under scrutiny. 
Follow-up studies could shed further light on this directionality. For example, one could 
argue that reciprocal expertise affirmation may be an important ingredient for 
psychological safety within the team because it can be expected to make people less 
reluctant to voice their expertise and ask for and give each other advice (MacPhail et al., 
2009). This, in turn, may reduce people’s fear to be rejected by the rest of the team if 
they express themselves (psychological safety). Reciprocal expertise affirmation may 
also enable people to get to know each other’s knowledge and skills and, as a 
consequence, foster trust of fellow members’ expertise (increase credibility).  
Conclusion 
To conclude, in this chapter we have shown that perceived expertise affirmation is a 
meaningful construct at both the individual and team level of analysis. Moreover, we 
have shown that team members’ individual perceptions of expertise materialize into a 
team-level emergent state (reciprocal expertise affirmation). That is, there are 
meaningful differences of perceived expertise affirmation within as well as between the 
teams. However, because this is only an initial construct validation, we look forward to 
future research that replicates the multi-level validation of perceived expertise 
affirmation and extends it by examining antecedents and consequences of this 
important multi-level construct for team work. In the next chapter, we take an initial 
step in identifying antecedents and consequences at both the individual as well as the 




PERCEIVED EXPERTISE AFFIRMATION IN WORK TEAMS: A MULTI-LEVEL EXAMINATION OF 
ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 
“The deepest principle of human nature is the craving to be appreciated".  
(William James, 1842-1910) 
 
Introduction 
Feeling valued and respected matters to people. Maslow’s (1943) proposition 
that esteem from others is a fundamental human need has been examined and 
confirmed in literature streams as diverse as team development, organizational 
socialization, and evolutionary and clinical psychology. For example, people are more 
inclined to interact with strangers who give them positive feedback such as 
compliments and admiration than with strangers who criticize and insult them (Jones, 
1973; Shrauger, 1975). Moreover, people who feel disrespected or even rejected by a 
group of peers have been shown to experience anxiety (Baumeister & Tice, 1990) and 
depression (Coie, Terry, Zakriski, & Lochman, 1995). To ensure that they are (still) 
valued and respected, and to prevent “social pain”, people continuously monitor their 
peers’ behaviors and reactions toward them (King, Kaplan, & Zaccaro, 2008; Sheldon & 
Johnson, 1993), especially in groups that are important to them (e.g., Bernstein, Sacco, 
Young, Cook, & Hugenberg, 2010). In short, esteem and affirmation of one’s qualities 
from important people is a fundamental human need that plays a major role in shaping 
our feelings and behaviors. 
Seeking positive affirmation is also one of the major reasons why people work 
(Vroom, 1964). Work is an important life domain and a salient source of meaning and 
self-definition for most individuals (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton, Roberts, & Bednar, 
2010). Many aspects define how employees see themselves in a work context, but one of 
the most important determinants of individuals’ work identities is their expertise – i.e. 
their extensive knowledge or abilities based on research, experience, or occupation in a 
particular area (Ericsson, 1996) –. Because employees generally strive to construct and 
maintain a positive work identity (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999), it is very important for 
                                                 
2 An adapted version of this chapter appeared as Grutterink, H., Vegt, G.S. van der, Molleman, E., & Jehn, K.A. 
(2010). Feeling known: A multi-level examination of perceived expertise affirmation in work teams. In A. 
Toombs (Ed.), Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings. In 2012, a previous version of this chapter 
was awarded with the SASP Outstanding Postgraduate Research Award (2nd place) in Adelaide. 




employees that their co-workers acknowledge and affirm their expertise. Unfortunately, 
until now, this topic has been underexplored (MacPhail, Roloff, and Edmondson, 2009). 
Nevertheless, understanding the antecedents and consequences of employees’ 
perceived expertise affirmation (i.e. the belief that one’s expertise is recognized and 
acknowledged by co-workers) in work teams is highly relevant. Expertise is a salient 
positive component of most employees’ identities, and perceived expertise affirmation 
may be a strong motivator that affects team members’ willingness to contribute to the 
team’s performance.  (MacPhail et al., 2009).  
 Even though perceived expertise affirmation originates as an individual variable, 
teams may also develop a collective belief that within their team members’ expertise is 
affirmed by their fellow members. To increase the effective functioning of 
organizational teams, it is important to examine not only the factors that contribute to 
individual perceptions of expertise affirmation but also the team-level factors that lead 
to the development of this collective belief of expertise affirmation within work teams. 
Therefore, in this study, we examine the individual as well as the team-level 
antecedents and consequences of perceived expertise affirmation in work teams. 
Building on prior research, we argue that perceived expertise affirmation is an 
individual cognitive variable that is related to the relative expertise, educational 
background similarities, and individual performances of team members. At the team 
level, we propose that it is related to inter-team differences in both longevity and size. 
Moreover, incorporating insights from the literature on team cognition (e.g., Cannon-
Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Rico, Sánchez-Manzanares, Gil, & Gibson, 2008; 
Wegner, 1986), we argue that excellent team performance on interdependent team 
tasks requires team members motivated by perceived expertise affirmation and the 
coordination of individual members’ contributions. Therefore, we propose that the 
relationship between perceived expertise affirmation and team performance depends 
on the team’s shared expertise perceptions. These hypotheses are tested in a sample of 
multi-level and multi-source data from 400 individuals distributed across 86 
organizational work teams from a variety of industries in the Netherlands. The results 
from this study provide insights into the origins and consequences of perceived 
expertise affirmation at work and increase our understanding of how identity-related 





Theory and Hypotheses 
Individual-level antecedents of perceived expertise affirmation  
Although numerous antecedents of perceived expertise affirmation may be 
distinguished, the identity literature roughly distinguishes two categories of factors that 
affect how the individual sees oneself in relation to others in a group: 
similarity/familiarity versus distinctiveness/uniqueness (Ashforth, Rogers, & Corley, 
2011; Brewer, 2003). Within these categories, we focus on variables that can be 
measured as objectively as possible to avoid common method and common source bias 
between our antecedents and perceived expertise affirmation. At the individual level of 
analysis, we, therefore, focused on educational background similarity as an antecedent 
related to similarity/familiarity, and on relative expertise as an antecedent related to 
distinctiveness/uniqueness. Moreover, we chose these two antecedents because they 
are both related to team members’ expertise, an important component of an individual’s 
identity within a work team (Van der Vegt, Van der Vliert, & Oosterhof, 2003). Below, 
we discuss these variables and their expected relationships with perceived expertise 
affirmation in more detail. 
According to the similarity-attraction paradigm (Byrne, 1971), similarity 
between people is a primary basis for interpersonal attraction. Research has shown, for 
example, that team members compare their own characteristics to those of other 
members (Hogg & Terry, 2000) and select interaction partners that are similar to them 
(Valenti & Rockett, 2008). The more similar individuals are to the rest of their team, the 
more frequently they interact with their fellow members when working together on 
tasks (Chatman, Polzer, Barsade, & Neale, 1998). As a result of these increased levels of 
interaction, team members may exchange more personal information, making it more 
likely that they will believe that their fellow members affirm their expertise. Moreover, 
research suggests that people generally assume that similar people think, feel, and act 
as they do themselves (Clement & Krueger, 2002) and that people expect to be more 














































































































                 
 
   
 
   
 













































































   
   




















































































This reasoning applies to similarities between individuals in general. Assuming that 
team members may be similar or different with respect to an almost infinite number of 
characteristics, the question is which types of similarity best predict perceived expertise 
affirmation. A first step in answering this question may be to realize that, depending on the 
context, some similarities are more salient to individuals than others (cf. Hogg & Terry, 
2000). Because expertise is an important resource in organizational work teams, we argue 
that similarities among team members with regard to expertise-related characteristics are 
important determinants.  
A second step in identifying important dimensions of similarity is suggested by the 
literature on demographic diversity and relational demography that distinguishes several 
indicators of expertise within work teams, including job type and educational background 
(e.g., Randel & Jaussi, 2003; Van der Vegt et al., 2003; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Research 
in this area suggests that similarity in job type and educational background capture 
important similarities in the type of knowledge and expertise held by team members (e.g., 
Harrison & Klein, 2007). Because similarities and differences between individuals’ 
educational backgrounds are less arbitrary and more easily coded than similarities or 
differences in job type (i.e. the differences between biology and psychology are more 
straightforward and well defined than the differences between a software developer and a 
project leader) and because the number of educational backgrounds is more limited than 
the number of job types, we reasoned that it might be most practical to focus on similarities 
in educational background. In addition, an individual’s educational background is often 
used as a key criterion for assigning members to teams because it offers a good indication 
of expertise (Reagans, Zuckerman, & McEvily, 2004). This line of reasoning leads us to 
expect that team members who are similar to their fellow team members in terms of 
educational background will think that others are more aware of their expertise. 
Specifically, they will perceive higher levels of expertise affirmation than those who are 
dissimilar. 
Hypothesis 1. An individual team member’s educational similarity to the rest of the 
team is positively related to his or her perceived expertise affirmation. 
In addition to similarities between team members in their expertise domain, another 
important factor that may affect individual team members’ perceived expertise affirmation 
is their general expertise level compared to that of other members. Expectation states 
theory (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972) posits that task-related expertise is often used as a 




specific status cue by team members; the higher a team member’s relative expertise within 
the team is, the higher that person’s status in the team will be (Berger et al., 1972). 
Research has shown that higher-status team members speak longer and that their actions 
and contributions receive more attention than those of lower-status members (see, for 
example, Shelly & Troyer, 2001). These heightened levels of participation and attention 
make the strengths and weaknesses of the relative expert member more visible to the rest 
of the team and to the expert team member herself. As a result, members with relatively 
high levels of expertise will feel more visible within the team and are more likely to think 
that their teammates are aware of their expertise. In contrast, members with relatively low 
levels of expertise will participate less in discussions, and their contributions will receive 
less attention, which will make them believe that their fellow team members are less aware 
of their expertise. In sum, this suggests a positive relationship between team members’ 
relative expertise and the extent to which they think fellow team members acknowledge 
and affirm their expertise.  
Hypothesis 2. An individual team member’s relative expertise within the team is 
positively related to his or her perceived expertise affirmation.  
Individual-level consequences of perceived expertise affirmation  
 As stated above, individual team members’ perceived expertise affirmation may 
have important implications for their individual performance. From the social psychological 
literature, we know that people’s perceptions of what others think about them can be very 
strong forces for individual motivation (e.g., Kenny, 1994; Vorauer, Hunter, Main, & Roy, 
2000). Members of work teams have been shown to define their self-worth by gathering 
relevant information through their interactions with other members (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986; Tyler & Blader, 2003). If they believe that fellow members recognize their expertise, 
this boosts their self-esteem and strengthens the self-group relationship (Tyler & Blader, 
2003). Such members are also likely to report high levels of commitment, effort, and 
responsibility (Tyler & Blader, 2003). In contrast, the belief that one’s expertise is not 
recognized may lead to negative self-fulfilling prophecies. Such individuals are likely to 
minimize their effort and disengage from the group (Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2005). 
Based on such findings, it is reasonable to expect that the more people believe that others 
affirm their expertise, the more they will be motivated to perform at higher levels.  
Hypothesis 3. An individual team member’s perceived expertise affirmation is positively 





Taking it to the team level: Antecedents of reciprocal expertise affirmation 
  Although perceived expertise affirmation may originate in individual cognition, 
theory suggests that teams may also develop a collective belief of expertise affirmation 
(MacPhail et al., 2009). Through differences in mutual interactions (e.g., frequency and 
quality of team meetings or discussions at lunch) and social activities, teams may start to 
differ in the extent to which they learn about how the rest of the team sees them.  
We follow MacPhail et al., (2009), and refer to this emerging team-level concept as 
reciprocal expertise affirmation and define it as a team’s collective belief that within this 
team the expertise of the members is acknowledged and recognized. A large number of 
team characteristics may affect reciprocal expertise affirmation. Because Ashforth et al. 
(2011) argue that optimal distinctiveness is crucial at all levels of identity construction and 
affirmation, we distinguish the same two broad categories of antecedents as for the 
individual-level construct: similarity/familiarity versus distinctiveness/uniqueness 
(Ashforth et al., 2011; Brewer, 2003). Moreover, in order to prevent common source and 
common method bias, we chose two team-level variables that were as objective as possible: 
team longevity as a proxy for familiarity between the team members and team size as a 
proxy for distinctiveness or uniqueness. 
Team longevity refers to the overlap between the length of time that team members 
have been on the team together (Carroll & Harrison, 1998). For example, if Jane has been a 
member for a year and John has been a member of the same team for only six months, their 
overlap in membership is six months. The longer team members have worked together, the 
more likely it is that stereotyping decreases between team members and that social 
interactions become more personal (e.g., Pearce & Herbik, 2004). As a result, team 
members disclose more information about each other and are more helpful. Time simply 
allows more information to be conveyed (Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998) and gives people 
more opportunities to show who they are. Taken together, this suggests that the longer the 
team members have worked together, the more familiar they become with one another, and 
the more likely they are to think that the rest of the team affirms their strengths and 
abilities. 
Hypothesis 4. Team longevity is positively related to reciprocal expertise affirmation. 
Another characteristic that may strongly influence the level of reciprocal expertise 
affirmation is team size. Research suggests that lower levels of interpersonal interaction 
and information exchange take place in large groups than in small groups (Williams & 




O'Reilly, 1998), making it harder for people to learn how fellow team members see them. 
Moreover, in larger teams there is less time available for each individual member to 
demonstrate his or her expertise or to discuss problems as a team (Morgan & Lassiter, 
1992). Consistent with this reasoning, the literature on “social loafing” has shown that in 
large teams, members feel that their contribution is only one among many others and that 
they are less visible to fellow team members (Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979). 
Therefore, team size not only decreases the visibility of individual team members’ 
contributions to the group product (Kameda, Stasson, Davis, Parks, & Zimmerman, 1992), 
but it also provides team members with fewer opportunities to observe how others react to 
their contributions. Therefore, one would expect members of larger teams to feel less 
visible and distinct within their team, and, therefore, to think fellow members are less 
aware of their expertise, resulting in meaningful differences in the level of reciprocal 
expertise affirmation between teams.  
Hypothesis 5. Team size is negatively related to reciprocal expertise affirmation. 
Individual-level consequences of reciprocal expertise affirmation 
Teams provide important contexts for influencing team members’ behavior 
(Hackman, 1992). According to role theory, for example, team members develop collective 
expectations about their own and fellow members’ roles that guide their behavior (e.g., 
Katz & Kahn, 1978). Also, implicit and explicit social influences within a team may make 
team members conform to team norms and practices. This may occur through cognitive or 
emotional contagion, processes through which a person or a group affects the emotions or 
behavior of another person or group through the conscious and unconscious induction of 
emotional or cognitive states or behavior (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Barsade, 2002).  
Even though perceived and reciprocal expertise affirmation are positively related 
because the basis for the latter lies in the perceptions of the individual members, both 
constructs may nevertheless vary independently. For example, teams with high levels of 
reciprocal expertise affirmation may still contain individuals with a low level of perceived 
expertise affirmation. The other way around is also possible. An individual may score very 
high on perceived expertise affirmation in a team with a low overall level of reciprocal 
expertise affirmation.  
In addition to the expected motivational effect of perceived expertise affirmation on 
individual performance, we also expect a positive relationship between reciprocal expertise 





expertise affirmation, overall, team members believe that their contribution to the 
collective performance is recognized, which motivates them to contribute their expertise to 
the team task (MacPhail et al., 2009). According to social learning principles (Bandura, 
1997), motivation in itself can be contagious. So, even if an individual scores low on 
perceived expertise affirmation, seeing the enthusiasm with which their fellow team 
members do their job may also motivate him or her to work harder.  
Moreover, in teams with a high level of reciprocal expertise affirmation it is much 
more likely that a climate of psychological safety arises (cf. MacPhail et al., 2009). This 
encourages team members to openly discuss their potential contributions and to bring in 
their expertise in order to come up with better and more creative solutions to team tasks. 
Because team tasks are interdependent, every team member may benefit from these 
creative ideas, suggestions and solutions that arise through such group discussions, and 
may positively affect individual team members’ performance.  
 The other way around may also be possible, a team that scores low on reciprocal 
expertise affirmation may be less inclined to engage in lively group discussions. This, in 
turn, may demotivate team members regardless of their individual level of perceived 
expertise affirmation. Overall, this suggests that in addition to, and independent from, the 
expected positive relationship between perceived expertise affirmation and performance at 
the individual level, there is a cross-level effect of reciprocal expertise affirmation that has 
the potential to explain additional variance in the individual performance of team 
members. 
Hypothesis 6. Reciprocal expertise affirmation is positively related to team 
member’s individual performance. 
Team-level consequences of reciprocal expertise affirmation  
 Inter-team differences in the level of reciprocal expertise affirmation may have 
important implications for team functioning and effectiveness. According to MacPhail et al. 
(2009), reciprocal expertise affirmation enables effective collaboration in work teams 
because it makes team members believe that their contribution to the collective 
performance is sufficiently recognized and that it is, therefore, safe to express uncertainty, 
disagreement or the need for advice without jeopardizing others’ positive views of their 
expertise. As a result, reciprocal expertise affirmation motivates team members to openly 
discuss their contributions and share their expertise to produce better and more creative 
team solutions.  




  Although the above reasoning suggests a direct positive relationship between 
reciprocal expertise affirmation and team performance, we argue that the team-level 
performance implications of reciprocal expertise affirmation are more complex. Because of 
the inherent interdependence in team work high levels of team performance require that 
individual contributions to the collective undertaking are smoothly coordinated (Rico et al., 
2008; Van de Ven, Delbecq, & Koenig, 1976). Indeed, for a team to perform well, its 
members must not only be motivated to contribute and fully utilize their individual 
expertise, but also have to align their activities with those of others who are working 
toward the same goal (e.g., Faraj, & Sproull, 2000). Research suggests that an important 
factor in the coordination of efforts between team members is the extent to which team 
members implicitly agree about their relevant expertise for a particular team task (Austin, 
2003; Levesque, Wilson & Wholey, 2001; Wegner, 1986). We will refer to this agreement as 
shared expertise perceptions.  
 Shared expertise perceptions can be seen as a specific component of a transactive 
memory system (TMS), defined as a cognitive system that combines the knowledge 
possessed by each individual with a shared and accurate awareness of who knows what 
(Wegner, 1986). That is, shared expertise perceptions refer to the extent to which team 
members have a similar view of fellow members’ expertise. So, in contrast to reciprocal 
expertise affirmation, shared expertise perceptions do not deal with the extent to which 
team members believe that other team members affirm their expertise (meta-perception) 
but regard the actual view team members have of each other (other-perception).  
  There are several reasons why shared expertise perceptions may function as an 
implicit coordination mechanism. First, agreement about “who knows what” promotes the 
development of an effective division of labor. When team members share expertise 
perceptions, they implicitly agree about who knows what, it is clear which members can be 
entrusted with a certain task. In this way, task assignment will run smoothly and efficiently 
(Wegner, 1986). Agreement about who is responsible for particular expertise allows team 
members to specialize and divide cognitive labor among themselves in terms of encoding, 
storing and retrieving information effectively (Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000). For 
example, this agreement can help team members to quickly send and request information 
from the appropriate individuals (Palazzolo, Serb, She, Su, & Contractor, 2006), to 
anticipate the actions, task demands, and needs of their colleagues, and to adjust their own 





these tasks without communicating intensively with each other (Rico et al., 2008) and can 
thus function as a road map for accessing and utilizing members’ expertise during task-
related interactions (Bunderson, 2003). 
  When the team members agree about one another’s expertise, effective coordination 
of activities is facilitated. In teams with high levels of shared expertise perceptions, 
reciprocal expertise affirmation will result in contributions, efforts, and actions that are in 
sync with the contributions, efforts, and actions of other individuals. Reciprocal expertise 
affirmation motivates team members to work hard, whereas the shared expertise 
perceptions ensure that the contributions resulting from such hard work are well 
coordinated. This makes it less likely that team members will lose precious time looking for 
information (Gibson & Vermeulen, 2003), duplicating actions, or doing unnecessary tasks, 
ultimately resulting in higher levels of team performance. Therefore, we expect that for 
teams with high levels of shared expertise perceptions, reciprocal expertise affirmation will 
be positively related to team performance.  
  In teams with low levels of shared expertise perceptions, reciprocal expertise 
affirmation may also stimulate team members to work diligently. However, the resulting 
effort will be partly in vain because individual activities are not appropriately coordinated. 
In such cases, it does not matter whether reciprocal expertise affirmation is high or the 
team is motivated because team processes are inefficient without coordination. This results 
in team members performing unnecessary tasks, work duplication, underuse of relevant 
areas of expertise, and shirked responsibilities. This suggests that reciprocal expertise 
affirmation will only be positively related to team performance in teams with high levels of 
shared expertise perceptions. 
Hypothesis 7. The relationship between reciprocal expertise affirmation and team 
performance is moderated by shared expertise perceptions; this relationship will only be 
positive in teams with high levels of shared expertise perceptions. 
  





Sample and data collection procedures 
 We tested our hypotheses with multi-source data from 86 teams of 400 white-collar 
workers in the Netherlands (24% management, 19.5% support and staff, 14.9% medical, 
13% financial, 9.2% sales, 8% information and communication technology, 6.9% service, 
and 3.4% education). To reduce mono-method and mono-source biases, we gathered 
survey and network data from both the supervisors and team members. Two weeks before 
the collection of the survey data, the supervisor of each team was interviewed about his or 
her demographics, team size, and the type of work performed by the team. The supervisors 
were also asked to list up to five expertise domains deemed most important for the 
effective accomplishment of their team’s goals (M=3.52, SD=1.17). For example, 
“knowledge about taxes” was a crucial expertise domain for a financial team, whereas for a 
nursing team in a psychiatric department of a hospital, “practical knowledge concerning 
care for psychiatric patients” was considered highly important. These expertise domains 
were used to determine team members’ relative expertise and to determine the teams’ 
levels of shared expertise perceptions (see the measurement section below). After the 
interview with the supervisor the team members were asked for their cooperation. During 
this meeting, the team members’ names and demographic information (e.g., age, gender, 
educational background, and team longevity) were collected.    
The second measurement took place two weeks later. Using a survey, team members 
rated each other’s expertise in the domains identified by the team supervisor and answered 
questions related to perceived expertise affirmation. To decrease employees’ reluctance to 
answer questions about specific colleagues, all questionnaires were distributed and 
gathered in person. In addition, it was explained that all data would be treated 
confidentially, that names would only be used to link responses from supervisors and 
subordinates, and that, after links had been established, names would be replaced by 
numbers. This increased participants’ trust that their answers would be treated 
confidentially and would only be seen by a third party. A positive side effect of this personal 
approach was that participants met once more with the researcher, which increased their 
willingness to participate and, in turn, increased the response rate. For supervisors, the 
second measurement entailed a survey in which they were asked to rate each member’s 





All 86 supervisors of the participating teams returned their questionnaires. 
Supervisors’ ages ranged from 21 to 61, with an average age of 37 years (SD=11.71). Their 
average number of months in the organization, position, and team were 108, 74, and 46, 
respectively. Twenty-nine supervisors were male (34%). Of the 522 team members, 400 
returned their surveys (a 77% response rate). Team members’ ages ranged from 18 to 67 
(M=34, SD=11.57). Their average number of months in the organization, position, and team 
were 80, 60, and 37, respectively. Of the 400 team members, 49.4% were male. 
Individual-level measures 
 Educational background similarity. Team members indicated which of nine 
categories best represented their educational background (“technical”, “managerial”, 
“legal”, “medical”, “natural sciences”, “economics”, “linguistic/cultural”, “social sciences”, or 
“other”). After coding the educational background similarity of all dyads within the team 
(0=dissimilar, 1=similar), we computed the educational background similarity for each 
individual as a percentage of fellow team members with similar educational backgrounds 
(i.e. a Euclidian distance measure; cf. Tsui & O’Reilly, 1989).  
Relative expertise. We asked team members to rate each of their fellow members on 
all of the team-specific expertise domains identified by the supervisor. The response scale 
for each domain ranged from 1 (“weak”) to 7 (“excellent”). Next, we computed individual 
team members’ relative expertise by computing the mean of the other team members’ 
ratings across the different domains and subtracting the mean level of expertise in a team. 
This individual deviation from the team mean resulted in a single score for each individual 
team member, which represented that individual’s relative expertise compared to the 
expertise of his or her teammates.   
Perceived expertise affirmation. We measured individual-level perceived expertise 
affirmation with three items developed for this study: “The other team members are 
precisely aware of my knowledge and expertise”, “The other team members know in detail 
what I know and what I am capable of”, and “The other team members have an accurate 
view of what I know”. Team members rated perceived expertise affirmation on a response 
scale ranging from 1 (“completely disagree”) to 5 (“completely agree”). Cronbach’s alpha 
for this scale was .85. 
Individual performance. Supervisors rated each individual team member’s 
performance using three items based on Turnley, Bolino, Lester, and Bloodgood (2003): 
“This team member fulfills his or her tasks the way I like them done”, “This employee fulfills 




his/her tasks in an effective manner”, and “Overall, this employee performs well in his/her 
job.” The response scale ranged from 1 (“completely disagree”) to 5 (“completely agree”). 
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .86.  
Team-level measures 
Team longevity. Team longevity is a team-level construct that captures the overlap in 
time that team members have worked together. Consistent with Carroll and Harrison 
(1998), we calculated team longevity by comparing the team tenure (in months) of every 
team member pair and determining the overlaps. For each pair, we chose the minimum 
value of the two scores because this was the number of months these two members had 
worked together on the team. We then averaged these overlapping months for all pairs of 
team members to represent team longevity (for the formula, see Carroll & Harrison, 1998: 
660). 
Team size. Team size is a team-level construct that measures the number of 
members in each team, excluding the team leader. This measure was reported by the team 
leaders and confirmed by the team members. Team sizes varied between 3 and 20 
members, with an average of 6.07 (SD=3.19). 
Reciprocal expertise affirmation. We aggregated the individual perceived expertise 
affirmation scores to the mean team levels to capture reciprocal expertise affirmation, that 
is, the mutual recognition by team members that they respect, value and affirm each other’s 
expertise (a composition variable, see Kozlowski & Klein, 2000), based on sufficient 
statistical support. The mean Rwg value for individual perceived expertise affirmation was 
.81 (James, Demaree, & Wolf. 1984). Furthermore, one-way analyses of variance showed 
that reciprocal expertise affirmation differed significantly between teams (F[314, 
85]=2.049. p<.0001). The ICC(1) value of .18 indicated that a significant proportion of the 
total variance was accounted for by team membership. ICC(2) was .52. Cronbach’s alpha 
was .88. 
Shared expertise perceptions. We operationalized shared expertise perceptions, as 
team members’ agreement regarding one another’s areas of expertise, using a direct 
approach (cf. Levesque et al., 2001). Social cognition researchers typically focus on intra-
team agreement about team members’ expertise as a crucial component of the social 
cognitive mechanisms for coordinating the encoding, storage, and retrieval of information 
among individuals in a team (Hollingshead, 2001). From this perspective, and as we 





to which the team has formed transactive memory (Austin, 2003; Moreland & Myaskovski, 
2000; Stasser, Vaughan, & Stewart, 2000). We used team members’ ratings ranging from 1 
(“weak”) to 7 (“excellent”) of each fellow member for the expertise domains identified by 
the supervisor. For each member, we calculated a standard deviation for each expertise 
domain to establish the extent to which other members of the team agreed about this focal 
individual member’s expertise. Next, we multiplied these values by –1 so that higher scores 
represented more agreement. We subsequently averaged these reversed standard 
deviations to obtain the team’s overall agreement measure for each individual team 
member. Finally, these individual mean standard deviations were aggregated to the team 
level to represent the extent to which the team agreed about each member’s expertise in all 
domains. In this case, a higher team score indicated a higher level of shared expertise 
perceptions.  
Team performance. The supervisors rated the performance of their team using six 
criteria adapted from Gibson, Zelmer-Bruhn, & Schwab (2003): “Continuity of the 
production process”, “Meeting deadlines”, “Speed at which products/services are 
delivered”, “Reliability”, “Control of the production process”, and “Consistency in the 
provided quality”. The response scale ranged from 1 (“far below average”) to 5 (“far above 
average”). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .70. 
Data analysis 
 Because of the nested structure of our dataset, we conducted two separate multi-
level analyses to test hypotheses 1-3 using MLwiN (e.g., Snijders & Bosker, 1999). To test 
our first two hypotheses, we determined a baseline model without predictor variables and 
then ran a second model containing the standardized individual-level predictor variables. 
The significance of the decrease in log-likelihood between the two models was established 
via a chi-squared difference test. To examine hypothesis 3, we ran a second analysis with 
individual performance as the dependent variable and perceived expertise affirmation as 
the predictor. We ran all analyses twice, once with and once without possible control 
variables (e.g., age, gender). These analyses led to the same conclusions. We chose to report 
the results of the analyses without the control variables because Becker (2005) has argued 
that including "impotent" control variables not only diminishes statistical power but also 
biases parameter estimates. 
 To test hypotheses 4-6 regarding the team-level antecedents and consequences of 
reciprocal expertise affirmation, we conducted two linear OLS regression analyses. In the 




first OLS regression, we used reciprocal expertise affirmation as the dependent variable, 
and we entered the hypothesized team-level antecedents, team longevity, and team size 
into the regression equation. In the second OLS regression analysis, we used team 
performance as the dependent variable and entered the main effects of reciprocal expertise 
affirmation and the team’s shared expertise perceptions in the first step of the analysis. In 
the second step, we entered the two-way interaction between reciprocal expertise 
affirmation and the team’s shared expertise perceptions. We standardized the independent 
variables before the interaction term was calculated (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).  
Results 
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations 
Table 3.1 presents the means, standard deviations (SD), and zero-order Pearson 
correlations for all study variables. The correlations between the individual-level variables 
do not take into account statistical dependence (nesting of individuals in teams) and hence 
should be interpreted with caution. 
Individual-level analyses 
 To test the hypothesized effects of the two individual-level antecedents of perceived 
expertise affirmation, we ran a multi-level analysis using MLwiN. After estimating the null-
model, the addition of the two individual-level predictors proved highly significant 
(Δχ²=17.30, df=2, p<.0005). As predicted, both team member educational background 
similarity and relative expertise were positively related to individual perceived expertise 
affirmation (b=.11, s.e.=.04, p<.01) and (b=.11, s.e.=.03, p<.001). These results support 
hypotheses 1 and 2. 
 Hypothesis 3 predicted a positive relationship between perceived expertise 
affirmation and individual performance. To test this, we conducted a separate multi-level 
analysis in MLwiN. For individual performance, the difference in model fit between the 
baseline model and the model in which individual perceived expertise affirmation was 
added was highly significant (ΔF²=10.97, df=1, p<.001). As expected, the coefficient 
estimate for the relationship between individual team members’ perceived expertise 
affirmation and supervisor-rated individual performance was positive and significant 








Univariate Statistics and Pearson Correlations 
   
  Individual-level variables (n=400) M SD 1  2 3 4 
1 Educational background similarity .45 .38        
2 Relative expertise .01 .63 .04       
3 Perceived expertise affirmation 3.40 .72 .14 ** .15 ***    
4 Individual performance 5.25 1.00 .09  .24 *** .17 ***  
 Team-level variables (n=86) M SD 1  2  3  4 
1 Team longevity 18.21 17.07        
2 Team size 6.07 3.19 .03       
3 Reciprocal expertise affirmation 3.42 .45 .20  -.32 **    
4 Shared expertise perceptions -.81 .33 .04  -.18  .22 *  
5 Team performance 3.56 .44 -.03  .02  .18  .01 
* p<.05  
** p<.01  
*** p<.005  






Team-Level Results of the Regression of Team Performance on Reciprocal Expertise 
















Team-level analyses  
 To test the hypothesized effects of the two team-level antecedents of reciprocal 
expertise affirmation, we ran an OLS regression analysis. The effect of these team-level 
predictors was highly significant (ΔR²=.15, ΔF=7.05, p=.001). An inspection of the 
regression weights showed that, as predicted, team longevity was positively related to 
reciprocal expertise affirmation (b=.10, t=2.08, p<.05), whereas the coefficient for team size 
was negative (b=-.15, t=-3.18, p<.01), supporting hypotheses 4 and 5, respectively.  
 We used the APIM-procedure from Kashy & Kenny (2000) to examine test 
hypothesis 6 that predicts that perceived expertise affirmation and reciprocal expertise 
affirmation contribute independently to the prediction of individual performance. The 
APIM-procedure was initially developed for analyzing dyadic data, but can take into 
account other types of nested data, such as, in our case individuals within teams. The first 
step of this procedure is to make the two focal constructs completely independent from 
each other by subtracting the team means from the individual scores. Thus, we created a 
  Team performance  
  Model 1      Model 2  
Model Variable     b   SE       b     SE  
1 Main effects Reciprocal expertise affirmation .08  .05  .07  .05  
   Shared expertise perceptions -.02  .05  -.01  .05  
           
2  Interaction Reciprocal expertise affirmation X 
Shared expertise perceptions 
    .11 * .04  
           
  ΔF 1.52    7.92 *   
  ΔR2 .04    .09 *   
  R2 .04    .12    





new individual-level variable by subtracting the team means (reciprocal expertise 
affirmation) from the individual scores (perceived expertise affirmation). Secondly, we ran 
a multi-level analysis with perceived and reciprocal expertise affirmation as simultaneous 
predictors of individual performance. Both perceived expertise affirmation and reciprocal 
expertise affirmation contributed independently to the prediction of individual performance 
(b=.17, s.e.=.06, p=.003), and (b=.22, s.e.=.08, p=.007), respectively.3 This confirmed 
hypothesis 6. 
To test the hypothesized consequences of reciprocal expertise affirmation for team 
performance, we conducted a second OLS regression analysis. The results of this analysis 
are shown in Table 3.2. Hypothesis 7 predicted that the team’s shared expertise 
perceptions would moderate the relationship between reciprocal expertise affirmation and 
team performance; there is only a positive relationship between reciprocal expertise 
affirmation and team performance if due to the shared expertise perceptions individual 
efforts are implicitly coordinated. The results showed that after adding the main effects of 
reciprocal expertise affirmation and the team’s shared expertise perceptions, the two-way 
interaction between reciprocal expertise affirmation and the team’s shared expertise 
perceptions was significant in predicting team performance (ΔR²=.09, ΔF=7.92, p=.006). 
To interpret this interaction, we calculated two simple slopes for reciprocal 
expertise affirmation at one standard deviation above and below the mean of the teams’ 
shared expertise perceptions (cf. Aiken & West, 1991). As predicted, for teams with high 
levels of shared expertise perceptions, reciprocal expertise affirmation was positively 
related to team performance (b=.19, t=3.23, p<.0001), whereas for teams with low levels of 
shared expertise perceptions, reciprocal expertise affirmation was unrelated to team 
performance (b=-.03, t=-.05, n.s.) (see Figure 3.2). Hypothesis 7 was thus confirmed. 
 
  
                                                 
3 At the individual level of analysis, we ran all our analysis twice, replacing individual performance by individual 
effort as rated by the supervisor. These analyses showed a similar pattern of results. Full results can be obtained by 
the author.   





Figure 3.2 Two-way interaction for the regression of team performance on reciprocal expertise 






This chapter demonstrates the relevance of the concept of perceived expertise 
affirmation in a work team context. We specified and empirically examined a partial 
nomological network of perceived expertise affirmation at both the individual and team 
levels of analysis, highlighting several antecedents and consequences. We used multi-
source data from 400 individuals distributed across 86 teams from a variety of industries in 
the Netherlands. The results generally supported the proposed model and provided several 
important insights. 
First, our study shows the usefulness of conceptualizing perceived expertise 
affirmation as a multi-level construct. A multi-level lens helped us to gain more insights into 





level of analysis, when compared to the team level. Our results show that meaningful 
differences may arise within as well as between teams regarding the extent to which 
members believe to be affirmed in their expertise. At the individual level of analysis, 
employee similarities in the educational background and relative levels of expertise shed 
light on the micro-foundations of perceived affirmation in work teams. At the team level of 
analysis, team longevity and team size partially explained how inter-team differences 
emerge in perceived affirmation. Moreover, perceived expertise affirmation and reciprocal 
expertise affirmation contributed independently to the prediction of individual 
performance. These findings suggest that it is important to treat individual perceived 
expertise affirmation and reciprocal expertise affirmation as separate constructs with 
different functions and structures (cf. Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Morgeson & Hofmann, 
1999).   
Second, by distinguishing between different levels of analysis, we were able to 
explain within-team as well as between-team variances in performance. Our finding of a 
direct and positive individual-level relationship between perceived expertise affirmation 
and individual performance as well as a conditional positive relationship between 
reciprocal expertise affirmation and team performance underscores the need to distinguish 
between individual-level and team-level perceived expertise affirmation. This contributes 
to the literature on positive identities at work (e.g., Dutton et al., 2010). More specifically, 
our results highlight the importance of the construction and maintenance of perceived 
expertise affirmation as a central and positive aspect of employees’ work identities at 
different levels of analysis. 
Third, our results support a growing body of research indicating that team mental 
models play an important role in the realization of team performance (e.g., Cannon-Bowers 
et al., 1993; Mohammed, Ferzandi, & Hamilton, 2010). At the same time, our findings add to 
this literature by showing that reciprocal expertise affirmation and shared expertise 
perceptions jointly predict team performance. This finding suggests that team members’ 
shared mental models about “who knows what” may be a necessary but insufficient 
condition to obtain high performance. Indeed, motivation caused by perceived expertise 
affirmation may be as important for high performance in interdependent teams as the team 
members’ abilities to recognize one another’s expertise (for similar findings, see Faraj & 
Sproull, 2000; Stasser et al., 2000). By providing insight into what motivates team 




members, our study increases the understanding of how work teams can effectively use 
their members’ collectively recognized areas of expertise. 
Strengths, limitations, and future research 
  The design of this study had several notable strengths that increase our confidence 
in the findings. For example, to prevent common variance, we gathered data from different 
sources (e.g., demographics, peer ratings, self-reports, and supervisor ratings). Moreover, 
we measured our variables at different points in time. This temporal separation of the 
measurement of the predictor and criterion variables minimized artificial covariation 
between our study variables (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Despite these 
strengths, there are also several study limitations that must be discussed. 
  First, this study was an initial step in relating perceived expertise affirmation to 
pertinent antecedents and consequences. Although we included several theoretically 
relevant variables at different levels of analysis using different sources, future research may 
examine a more comprehensive nomological net of perceived expertise affirmation in work 
teams. Possible additional antecedents that could be studied include task interdependence 
(Van der Vegt et al., 2003; Wageman, 1995), extraversion (Barrick, Stewart, Neubert, & 
Mount 1998), and emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995). Possible additional 
consequences are affective outcomes, such as satisfaction, team commitment or lowered 
levels of work stress among members. 
 Second, our study design did not allow us to explicitly test the direction of causality 
of the relationships suggested in our model. The relationship between individual perceived 
expertise affirmation and supervisor-rated individual performance, for example, could be 
opposite to what we have suggested. It is possible that individual team members may 
report higher levels of perceived expertise affirmation after they receive positive 
performance evaluations from their supervisors. Alternatively, and perhaps even more 
realistically, reciprocal relationships may exist between our study variables. A longitudinal 
research design in which the variables of interest are all measured at two or more periods 
in time is needed to address such issues.  
 Third, future research could increase our understanding of the mechanisms that are 
responsible for the effects of perceived expertise affirmation, specifically by examining the 
role of mediator variables. For example, self-verification theory states that when people feel 
known, they feel safe and believe that future interactions will be free from conflict (Swann 





Terry, 2000) or psychological safety (MacPhail et al., 2009) may play an important 
mediating role in the relationship between reciprocal expertise affirmation and 
performance. 
Fourth, it is important to note that even though people usually dedicate much time 
to observing others’ behaviors and reactions toward them, their conclusions about how 
others see them may not always be accurate (Kenny, 1994). Although research has shown 
that people are competent at predicting how specific others see them (Elfenbein, 
Eisenkraft, & Ding, 2009), it is possible that individuals sometimes rely too heavily on self-
knowledge in judging how others view them. It might thus be interesting to empirically 
examine the relationships between perceived expertise affirmation and the accuracy of 
these perceptions, as well as how these two dimensions – perceptions and accuracy – 
together affect relevant outcome variables. 
Finally, it is important to examine what types of teams and individuals are most 
likely to benefit from expertise affirmation. For example, MacPhail et al. (2009) predicted 
that reciprocal expertise affirmation is especially useful as a motivational mechanism in 
teams consisting of people whose expertise domains differ. In such teams, perceived 
expertise affirmation might help to overcome problems that arise as a result of social 
categorization processes (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Additionally, it might be interesting to 
examine the role of personality variables. With regard to the motivation and performance 
of individual team members, perceived expertise affirmation may be more important for 
some individuals than for others and, as such, may have stronger effects for certain types of 
individuals (e.g., those with a high need for approval; Leary, 1983). Future research should 
identify the characteristics of teams and individuals for which perceived expertise 
affirmation is most important.   
Practical implications  
  Despite these limitations, our results also provide some directions for practical 
interventions aimed at increasing motivation and performance in organizational work 
teams. In general, our results suggest that it is preferable to form small teams that work 
together for longer periods of time. Because the ability to influence team composition is 
often lacking, it is probably most effective to directly target interventions aimed at 
increasing individual team members’ perceived expertise affirmation. For example, 
interventions such as cross-training and team building activities may ease team members’ 
evaluative concerns (see Gaertner et al., 1999). More specifically, and following the value-




in-diversity literature (Bettencourt & Sheldon, 2001), one may consider interventions 
aimed at stressing unique individual skills while making clear how these are indispensable 
for team performance as a whole. Team meetings in which all members have time to 
discuss their strengths and weaknesses in relevant domains and how these are related to 
the team products and outcomes may be useful in this regard. Finally, given the moderating 
role of shared expertise perceptions seen in this study, organizations might develop tools 
that facilitate the development and maintenance of shared perceptions regarding members’ 
knowledge and expertise. Simple tools (e.g., electronic directories) that show members’ 
domains of expertise could be a good starting point (Moreland, 1999). 
Conclusion 
Clearly, empirical research of expertise affirmation in organizational work teams is 
in its infancy. This study takes an initial step toward increasing our understanding of the 
role of expertise affirmation in work teams by identifying both individual- and team-level 
antecedents and showing their motivating potential and implications for team 
performance. Because continued research is required to fully understand the role of 
perceived expertise affirmation in organizations, it is our hope that the insights from this 
study will encourage organizational scholars to embark on substantive research addressing 





RECIPROCAL EXPERTISE AFFIRMATION AND SHARED EXPERTISE PERCEPTIONS IN WORK 
TEAMS: THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR COORDINATED ACTION AND TEAM PERFORMANCE 
 
Introduction 
Working in teams, as a strategy for managing complex work (Devine, Clayton, 
Philips, Dunford, & Melner, 1999), necessitates employees’ consideration of their social 
environment. Due to greater task interdependence and ubiquity of social interaction in 
work teams, and the evaluative, performance-driven nature of teamwork, it is very 
important for team members to observe and interpret each other’s behavior. Many studies 
have shown that these perceptions and evaluations of other members strongly affect team 
processes and effectiveness (for an overview, see Hackman, 1992). Much less is known, 
however, about the role of another important element of interpersonal perception, namely 
the effects of team members’ beliefs about how other members view them, i.e. their meta-
perceptions (Kenny, 1994; King, Kaplan, & Zaccaro, 2008). 
People’s meta-perceptions may nevertheless play an important role in team settings. 
For example, team members’ choice of whom to work with within the team may not only be 
determined by the expertise level of fellow team members, but also by how they think these 
potential collaborators perceive them. That is, team members may refrain from working 
with technically competent fellow members to reduce the chance that they may form an 
unfavorable impression of them. In contrast, when people are certain that their fellow 
members acknowledge their unique, positive characteristics they may become less 
reluctant to ask for advice, express dissent, or offer help to their fellow team members. 
One of the most important characteristics that helps people define who they are at 
work is their task-related expertise (cf. Molleman & Broekhuis, 2012; Molleman, Broekhuis, 
Stoffels, & Jaspers, 2010). People’s task-related expertise (henceforth expertise) 
encompasses their knowledge, skills, or ability in a particular area of study that is 
important for completing their specific subtasks within the work team. Because expertise 
incorporates employees’ strengths, talents, and skills, it is a central and positive aspect of 
their work identity (cf. Roberts, Dutton, Spreitzer, Heaphy, & Quinn, 2005; Van der Vegt & 
                                                 
4 This chapter is based on Grutterink, H., Vegt, G.S. van der, Molleman, E., & Jehn, K.A. (in press). Reciprocal 
Expertise Affirmation and Shared Expertise Perceptions in Work Teams: Their Implications for Coordinated Action 
and Team Performance. Applied Psychology: An International Review. 
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Bunderson, 2005). Research has shown that people strive to maintain a positive identity 
(Dutton, Roberts, & Bednar, 2010). Therefore, and because expertise is a crucial cognitive 
resource in work teams (Faraj & Sproull, 2000) one would expect that team members’ 
mutual recognition that fellow members acknowledge and recognize their expertise – i.e. 
reciprocal expertise affirmation (MacPhail, Roloff, & Edmondson, 2009) – is a strong 
motivational force in work teams.  
In 2009, MacPhail et al. called for research examining the effects of reciprocal 
expertise affirmation on team processes and performance outcomes. They argued that 
reciprocal expertise affirmation may facilitate the understanding, verification and 
integration of different expertise domains and as such allows teams to more effectively use 
their individual members’ strengths. Unfortunately, the potential impact of reciprocal 
expertise affirmation on team processes and performance outcomes has still received little 
empirical attention. The present study aims to replicate and extend the findings in the 
previous chapter by investigating the relationship between reciprocal expertise affirmation 
and teams’ coordinated action (a process variable) as well as the teams’ performance (an 
outcome variable; cf. Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006). Specifically, we propose that in teams with 
higher levels of reciprocal expertise affirmation, members will be more motivated to 
contribute their expertise to the team task in order to reach higher levels of team 
performance through better coordinated action.  
As in Chapter 3, we propose that high levels of reciprocal expertise affirmation are a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to establish high levels of team performance. The 
reason is that work teams are comprised of members who are at least moderately 
interdependent (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006), which means that team members should 
coordinate their individual contributions in order to realize high team performance. Team 
cognition research has shown that an important determinant of intra-team coordination is 
the extent to which team members’ perceptions of task-relevant characteristics overlap 
(Salas, Sims, & Burke, 2005). Shared perceptions lead to common expectations, which 
makes it easier to agree about who will do which tasks and with whom to coordinate 
actions (see, for example, Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, 
& Cannon-Bowers, 2000). Accordingly, and because we focus on task-related expertise, we 
argue that the sharedness of team members’ expertise perceptions will moderate the 





Moreover, we propose that this interactive effect indirectly affects team performance 
through coordinated action. 
Below, we first clarify the meaning of our core constructs by discussing the 
similarities and differences with related constructs. Next, we elaborate on the theoretical 
mechanisms that explain why and how reciprocal expertise affirmation can be expected to 
influence team coordinated action and, indirectly, team performance, and how sharedness 
of expertise perceptions is expected to moderate these relationships. Then, we report the 
results of a study among 39 student management teams working on a complex four-week 
business simulation, developed to test our hypotheses. 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Reciprocal expertise affirmation  
  Reciprocal expertise affirmation represents the extent to which team members 
affirm each other’s expertise (MacPhail, et al. 2009). The basis of reciprocal expertise 
affirmation lies in team members’ individual meta-perceptions, that is, their perceptions 
about how other team members see them (Kenny, 1994). It can be measured by asking 
individual team members how they personally believe that other team members affirm 
their expertise by using an individual referent. If team members communicate with each 
other, voice their opinion, and work collectively on the team task, it is likely that over time 
team members develop similar beliefs about the extent to which other members affirm 
their expertise so that perceived expertise affirmation becomes reciprocal. 
  Reciprocal expertise affirmation differs from seemingly related constructs like 
collective efficacy and psychological safety. These constructs represent team climates in 
which team members all think that the team has the ability to perform a wide range of tasks 
across different activities (collective efficacy; Stajkovic, Lee, & Nyberg, 2009), or they will 
not be harmed if they make or report mistakes, ask for advice or seek feedback 
(psychological safety; Edmondson, 1999). In contrast to reciprocal expertise affirmation, 
both collective efficacy and psychological safety are rooted in team members’ perceptions 
about the team as a whole, using a team referent. Moreover, these constructs do not focus 
on expertise but on the content domains of anticipated performance and the absence of 
perceived threat, respectively. Finally, reciprocal expertise affirmation and collective 
efficacy are cognitive constructs, while psychological safety is more affective in nature.  
  Reciprocal expertise affirmation also differs from a transactive memory system 
(TMS), defined as a cognitive system that combines the knowledge possessed by each 
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individual with a shared and accurate awareness of who knows what (Wegner, 1986). 
Reciprocal expertise affirmation does not deal with the extent to which team members are 
actually aware of one another’s knowledge, but with the extent to which team members 
believe that other team members respect and value their expertise. Moreover, compared to 
TMSs, where the accuracy of team members’ understanding of who knows what is very 
important (e.g., Austin, 2003), the accuracy of team members’ beliefs about how their 
fellow team members see them is not the primary concern. Finally, reciprocal expertise 
affirmation stems from meta-perceptions of individual team members, whereas TMSs 
represent shared perceptions of who knows what (cf. Kenny, 1994). 
The motivating role of reciprocal expertise affirmation 
  When all the members of a team believe that other members respect, value, and 
affirm their individual expertise, they believe that their contribution to the collective 
performance is recognized, which motivates them to contribute to the team task (MacPhail 
et al., 2009). As a result, reciprocal expertise affirmation can be expected to be essential for 
expertise contribution because it encourages team members to openly discuss their 
potential contributions and to bring in their expertise in order to come up with better and 
more creative solutions to team tasks. We thus argue that work teams characterized by 
higher levels of reciprocal expertise affirmation will be more motivated and work harder 
than teams with lower levels of reciprocal expertise affirmation.  
  However, in order to reap the benefits of this higher motivation, and to realize high 
team performance, the contributions of all the individual team members need to be 
coordinated (Rico, Sánchez-Manzanares, Gil, & Gibson, 2008; Van de Ven, Delbecq, & 
Koenig, 1976). Therefore, within teams, one must assign tasks to those members who are 
most capable of fulfilling them, and exchange information and work products with each 
other in a timely manner. This suggests that reciprocal expertise affirmation is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for high levels of team performance. For a team to be successful 
its members must not only be motivated to contribute their individual expertise for the 
benefit of the team, they must also coordinate these contributions with others who are 
working toward the same goal (e.g., Faraj & Sproull, 2000).  
An increasing number of studies in the teamwork literature has stressed the 
importance of shared expertise perceptions for the successful coordination of individual 
members’ actions (e.g., Austin, 2003; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Mathieu et al., 2000; 





expertise affirmation will only be beneficial for team processes and outcomes if the 
members of the team in question have developed shared expertise perceptions. Taken 
together, this suggests a research model in which the relationship between reciprocal 
expertise affirmation and team performance is contingent on the team’s sharedness of 
expertise perceptions, and is mediated by coordinated action – a team process variable 
reflecting the extent to which team members work together smoothly and without 
misunderstandings (Lewis, 2003; see Figure 4.1). 
The Moderating Role of Sharedness of Expertise Perceptions 
We define ‘sharedness of expertise perceptions’ as the extent to which team 
members agree about each other’s expertise (Kenny, 1994). These shared perceptions 
comprise an important element of a TMS (see the section about reciprocal expertise 
affirmation above) (Austin, 2003). In terms of multi-level theory, sharedness of expertise 
perceptions is operationalized as a dispersion variable (Chan, 1998): the convergence 
between individual team members’ perceptions represents the extent to which individuals 
share a common knowledge structure (Mathieu et al., 2000). The sharedness of expertise 
perceptions and reciprocal expertise affirmation can vary independently. Even if all the 
team members hold similar perceptions of one another’s expertise (high sharedness), they 
may still believe that the other team members are not aware of their expertise (low 
expertise affirmation) or vice versa.  
When expertise perceptions are shared, team members are able to efficiently use 
one another’s knowledge and expertise. Shared expertise perceptions function as a 
roadmap that enables team members to identify and optimally utilize each other’s expertise 
during task-related interactions (Bunderson, 2003). If team members are agreed about 
each individual team member’s level of expertise, it is clear which individuals can be 
entrusted with a specific task and which need supervision (Liang, Moreland, & Argote, 
1995). As a result, tasks and responsibilities can be more effectively and efficiently 
distributed among team members (Larson, Christensen, & Abbott, 1996): If team members 
need information, advice, or guidance, they will consult the individual about whom 
everyone agrees that he or she has expertise in that area (Olivera & Argote, 1999). In such 
conditions, higher levels of reciprocal expertise affirmation will not only result in greater 
motivation to contribute one’s individual knowledge and expertise, these contributions will 
also be in tune with other members’ actions (sharing information with the right person, 
asking the right people for advice, etc.), resulting in more coordinated action. Thus, the 
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higher the level of shared expertise perceptions within the team, the more reciprocal 
expertise affirmation will be positively related to coordinated action.  
However, when expertise perceptions are not shared, team members do not agree 
about who knows what, and are therefore less able to efficiently use one another’s 
knowledge and expertise. While, under such circumstances, high levels of reciprocal 
expertise affirmation may certainly stimulate team members’ motivation to work hard and 
fulfill their responsibilities, the absence of shared expertise perceptions makes it more 
likely that team members will turn to the wrong person for information or advice, and so 
receive incorrect information and make more errors. As a result, unique expertise remains 
unused and/or certain tasks are done incorrectly, or not at all. This will especially be the 
case if tasks are disjunctive (Steiner, 1972) or complex (Wood, 1986), because such tasks 
require the input of all the team members. When the sharedness of expertise perceptions 
within such teams is low, higher levels of reciprocal expertise affirmation are unlikely to 
increase coordinated action. Consequently: 
Hypothesis 1: Teams with higher levels of reciprocal expertise affirmation will report 
more coordinated action, but only when the sharedness of expertise perceptions is high.  
Moreover, we would expect the joint effects of reciprocal expertise affirmation and 
sharedness of expertise perceptions on coordinated action to have implications for team 
performance. For example, in management teams, financial strategies aimed at reducing 
costs cannot be implemented in isolation without understanding their repercussions on 
production, marketing, and human resource management strategies. Similarly, a marketing 
strategy aimed at increasing sales should not be developed without first determining if the 
production capacity is sufficient to meet the increased sales volume. In other words, the 
members of such teams need to coordinate their general activities in order to develop and 
formulate sound integrated business strategies. If actions are not optimally coordinated, 
members’ individual actions will be partially or entirely wasted. This will result in 
redundant work, delays in production, and expertise not being used, all resulting in a 
lowered team performance (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006).  
It follows that, by influencing coordinated action, reciprocal expertise affirmation 
and sharedness of expertise perceptions can have important implications for the 
performance of a team. Specifically, we would expect that team members’ reciprocal 





perceptions are shared, and that this effect will be mediated by the team’s coordinated 
action. Rephrased, this results in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Coordinated action mediates the interactive effect of reciprocal expertise 
affirmation and the sharedness of expertise perceptions on team performance in the 
sense that we expect an indirect and positive effect of reciprocal expertise affirmation 
on team performance through coordinated action for teams with high levels of shared 
expertise perceptions, but not for teams with low levels of shared expertise perceptions. 
 











Sample and task 
We tested our hypotheses using data from 39 teams that competed with each other 
during a realistic four-week business simulation. This simulation was part of the 
curriculum of a Bachelor of Business Administration degree in the Netherlands. Each team 
worked as the senior management team of a fictitious company producing either skiing or 
diving equipment and worked on three fixed eight-hour days each week on the business 
simulation. The teams had to deal with broadly the same issues as the senior management 
of a real start-up company. For example, each team had to make decisions regarding its 
marketing strategy, its R&D budget, and its personnel reward system. As in real companies, 
the teams also had to prepare a financial plan, a business plan, and determine the prices of 
their products as well as how many products they wanted to keep in stock. Even though the 
tasks pertaining to each role were described clearly in the manual, the team task required 
constant coordinated action. For example, it would be impossible to make important R&D 
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decisions without consulting the financial manager. So, constant coordinated action was 
required for high team performance. At the end of each week, the teams had to explain their 
decisions and team results to the ‘Supervisory Board’. This board was made up of experts 
from the field, mainly CEOs from Dutch companies.  
Students were randomly assigned to teams. Team size ended up varying between 
five and seven members (M=5.95; SD=.65) as a result of unforeseen events such as illness. 
Together, the team members had to fulfill six predetermined roles that they distributed 
among themselves: general manager, financial manager, human resource manager, legal 
manager, commercial manager, and research and development manager. In teams with five 
members, the roles of commercial manager and general manager were combined, whereas 
in seven-person teams, the role of either the general manager or the legal manager was 
shared by two members. Each role involved several responsibilities and corresponding 
expertise domains, and was extensively described in a simulation manual so that all team 
members were well aware of the tasks, responsibilities, and expertise domains associated 
with each role. Team members shared the roles out based on individual preferences and 
previous expertise due to their concentration courses (for example, some students had 
followed more marketing courses, whereas others had chosen a more financial focus). The 
process of distributing roles among team members, and thus task-related expertise 
differentiation and development, started immediately after group formation. Each team 
member fulfilled the same role(s) during the entire four weeks.  
All team members were required to be present at least three eight-hour days a week 
(i.e. on Monday, Tuesday, and Thursday). Additionally, attendance was required during 
specific meetings with, for example, bank representatives, and Supervisory Board 
members. In practice, most teams spent much more time working on the simulation than 
formally required because of deadlines and felt responsibility for team performance. 
Students were not compensated for participation; the simulation was an obligatory part of 
their Bachelor’s program. They received course credits after fulfilling all formal course 
requirements. 
Data collection 
We gathered data using surveys from the students, and obtained team performance 
ratings from the members of the Supervisory Board. We also collected data regarding team 
members’ gender, age, and nationality several days before the start of the business 





20 to 27 with an average of 22. Except for five Germans, all the participants were Dutch. 
Because we were interested in the effects of reciprocal expertise affirmation, and it takes 
time for reciprocal expertise affirmation to develop, we decided to collect the survey data 
from the team members during the third week of the business simulation. This survey 
assessed the team’s reciprocal expertise affirmation, sharedness of expertise perceptions, 
and coordinated action. We explicitly told students that their responses would not influence 
their grades in any way. Of the 232 survey forms sent out, 226 were returned (a 97.4% 
response rate). The Supervisory Board’s ratings of the performance of each team were 
collected at the end of the simulation, one week later.  
Measures 
Reciprocal expertise affirmation was measured using a social network approach. We 
envisage reciprocal expertise affirmation as originating from team members’ individual 
perceptions of expertise affirmation, but emerging as a team-level property through 
members’ mutual interactions (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). As is typical in network research, 
we used a single network question to measure this variable (see, for example, Bowler & 
Brass, 2006). All team members rated their fellow team members on the item “How much is 
this person aware of your expertise?” (1=“very little” to 7=“very much”). The mean Rwg 
value for these dyadic perceptions of expertise affirmation ratings was .84 suggesting that 
each individual team member tended to perceive his or her fellow team members in a 
similar way (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984). Therefore, we calculated the team member’s 
mean rating of all the other team members (i.e. the “outdegree” centrality of each individual 
team member’s dyadic responses; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Consistent with our 
assumption that over time team members may come to converge in their perceptions of 
expertise affirmation, one-way analyses of variance showed that individual perceptions of 
expertise affirmation differed more between than within teams (F[38, 188]=2.407, 
p<.0001). The ICC(1) value of .22 indicated that a significant proportion of the total 
variance was accounted for by team membership. Since ICC(2) was .58, we were justified in 
aggregating the individual perceptions of expertise affirmation to reflect the team’s 
reciprocal expertise affirmation. 
Sharedness of expertise perceptions.5 The sharedness of team members’ expertise 
perceptions was also assessed using a social network approach. Specifically, all 
                                                 
5 We did not focus on different expertise domains (“who knows what”) because, in our sample, it was clear which 
member held which role. It was, therefore, more relevant whether someone had sufficient expertise to effectively 
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respondents rated their fellow members’ level of expertise by means of the item “How 
much expertise concerning his or her role does this person possess?” (1=“very little” to 
7=“very much”) (M=4.91; SD=.48). From these scores, we established the extent to which 
team members agreed about each individual member’s level of expertise with regard to the 
specific role they fulfilled in the team. In line with earlier research, we operationalized 
sharedness of expertise perceptions as the mean standard deviation of team members’ 
scores of each other’s expertise (e.g., Austin, 2003; Schneider, Salvaggio, & Subirats, 2002). 
The calculations resulted in a mean standard deviation reflecting the extent to which team 
members shared the same view of all members’ expertise levels. We multiplied these values 
by –1 so that higher scores reflected higher levels of shared expertise perceptions. Because 
a derivative of the within-group variance is used as an operationalization of the higher level 
team construct, Chan (1998) refers to this type of higher level constructs as a dispersion 
variable.  
 Coordinated action was measured using three items adapted from Lewis (2003). The 
items read: “Our team works together in a well-coordinated fashion”, “Our team has very 
few misunderstandings about what to do”, and “We work together smoothly and efficiently” 
(1=“strongly disagree” to 5=“strongly agree”). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .83. The 
mean Rwg value for coordinated action was .90. ANOVA results showed that coordinated 
action differed significantly between teams (F [38, 188]=2.236, p<.0001). ICC(1) was .20, 
and ICC(2) was .55.  
 Team performance was rated by the team of three external experts, referred to as the 
Supervisory Board. Following LePine, Colquitt, & Erez (2000) the performance criterion in 
this study was performance in a broad sense. During their final meeting with the Board, all 
management teams had to present their business results and to defend the decisions they 
had made throughout the simulation. After this meeting, the Supervisory Board members 
discussed until they agreed as a group on the overall performance of the team, and 
subsequently rated the teams on their overall team performance on a 10-point scale 
(1=“extremely poor” to 10=“excellent”; cf. Amason, 1996).  
Control variables. We also included several control variables that prior research has 
identified as associated with team processes and outcomes. We measured team size, 
because larger teams may have access to more resources and may achieve greater 
                                                                                                                                                              
fulfill that role. Indeed, for the implicit coordination of tasks it was necessary that the team members agreed about 





efficiency by dividing the task into a greater number of sub-tasks, which may positively 
influence their performance. Moreover, when studying mean levels of team member 
characteristics, researchers have suggested that it is important to control for within-team 
variations (Kirkman & Shapiro, 2005). We, therefore, examined within-team dispersion 
regarding reciprocal expertise affirmation operationalized as the intra-team standard 
deviation of reciprocal expertise affirmation. Following the suggestion from an anonymous 
reviewer, we also controlled for liking among team members. Liking was measured with the 
network-item “How much would you like to have this person as a friend” (1=“very little” to 
5=“very much”) (M=4.26; SD=.67). Finally, given that research has shown that team 
members’ overall level of expertise may be an important predictor of coordinated action 
and team performance (e.g., Austin, 2003) we also included the team’s mean level of 
perceived expertise. 
Our results indicated no significant associations between any of these covariates and 
coordinated action and team performance. Moreover, all analyses presented essentially 
identical results with and without our controls6. Since Becker (2005) showed that including 
unnecessary controls not only reduces statistical power but may also produce biased 
estimates and significance levels, we excluded all covariates from any further analyses and 
report the results of analyses without controls. 
Data analysis 
All our analyses were conducted at the team level of analysis. We predicted a 
moderated mediation or conditional indirect effect and followed the conventional 
procedure using an SPSS macro developed by Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes (2007). This 
procedure facilitates the estimation of conditional indirect effects while making use of 
bootstrapped confidence intervals. The most important advantage of bootstrapping is that 
it avoids power problems introduced by asymmetric and other non-normal sampling 
distributions of an indirect effect (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004). We 
standardized all our independent variables as well as the mediator prior to the analyses 
(Cohen & Cohen, 1983).  
Results 
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations 
Table 4.1 displays the means, standard deviations (SD), and zero-order Pearson 
correlations of the variables outlined in the previous section. Reciprocal expertise 
                                                 
6 Results can be obtained from the author. 
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affirmation and the team’s sharedness of expertise perceptions were unrelated, which 
suggests that these two constructs are not only conceptually but also empirically distinct. 
Moreover, both reciprocal expertise affirmation and the team’s sharedness of expertise 
perceptions were unrelated to coordinated action and team performance. As expected, 
coordinated action and team performance were strongly and positively related (r=.56, 
p<.001). 
Tests of the hypotheses 
Table 4.2 displays the results for our hypotheses tests. Hypothesis 1 predicted that 
the team’s sharedness of expertise perceptions would moderate the expected positive 
relationship between reciprocal expertise affirmation and coordinated action. Indeed, the 
results show that the two-way interaction between reciprocal expertise affirmation and 
sharedness of expertise perceptions on coordinated action was significant (b=.65, t=4.03, p 
<.001).  
In order to interpret this interaction, we calculated the simple slopes for reciprocal 
expertise affirmation at one standard deviation above and one standard deviation below 
the mean of sharedness of expertise perceptions (Aiken & West, 1991). As predicted, for 
teams with high levels of shared expertise perceptions, reciprocal expertise affirmation was 
positively related to coordinated action (b=.99, t=4.69, p<.001), whereas for teams with low 
levels of shared expertise perceptions, reciprocal expertise affirmation was unrelated to 
coordinated action (b=-.31, t=-1.50, n.s.) (see Figure 4.2). These results support Hypothesis 
1. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that this moderation effect would also indirectly predict 
team performance through coordinated action. In order to test this, we examined the 
conditional indirect effect of reciprocal expertise affirmation (through coordinated action) 
at three values of sharedness of expertise perceptions (see middle of Table 4.2): the mean, 
one standard deviation above the mean (high levels of shared expertise perceptions), and 
one standard deviation below the mean (low levels of shared expertise perceptions). 
Normal-theory tests indicated that, as expected, the conditional indirect effect was positive 
and significant for teams with high levels of shared expertise perceptions while they did not 
differ significantly from zero for teams with average and low levels of shared expertise 
perceptions. Bootstrap confidence intervals (CIs) corroborated these results.  
Preacher et al.’s (2007) moderated mediation macro also computes conditional 





data (see the lower half of Table 4.2). This output complements the more typical probing of 
the interaction using one standard deviation above and below the mean, and it allowed us 
to identify at which values of shared expertise perceptions the significance of the 
conditional indirect effect becomes exactly .05. Our results demonstrated that the 
conditional indirect effect of reciprocal expertise became significant at any value higher 
than .47 on the standardized scale of shared expertise perceptions. These results support 
Hypothesis 2. That is, the indirect and positive effect of reciprocal expertise affirmation on 
team performance through coordinated action was observed for teams with high levels of 




Table 4.1  




  Variables M SD 1 2  3 4  5 6 7   
1  Team size 5.95 .65          
2  Perceived expertise affirmation (sd) .77 .23 -.22         
3  Mean expertise level 4.91 .48 .25 .10        
4  Liking 4.26 .67 .15 .06 .52 **      
5  Reciprocal expertise affirmation 4.47 .51 .11 .14 .64 **  .78 **   
6  Sharedness of expertise perceptions -.89 .24 .09 -.13 .03  .19  .06   
7  Coordinated action 3.51 .37 .07 .12 .34 * .22  .32 -.11  
8  Team performance  7.42 1.25 .14 .26 .14  .13  .20 -.01 .56 ** 
** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed). (n=39 teams). 
  * Correlation is significant at the .05 level 
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Table 4.2  
Regression results for conditional indirect effect 
 
Predictor    B    SE      t    p 
 Coordinated action    
Constant -0.04  0.13  -0.29 .775 
Reciprocal expertise affirmation (REA)   0.34  0.13    2.61 .013 
Sharedness of expertise perceptions (SEP) -0.12  0.13  -0.88 .385 
REA X SEP   0.65  0.16    4.03 .001 
 Team performance    
Constant   7.41 0.17 42.68 .001 
Coordinated action   0.60 0.23    2.64 .013 
Reciprocal expertise affirmation   0.07 0.19    0.35 .730 
Sharedness of expertise perceptions   0.06 0.18    0.32 .751 
REA X SEP   0.23 0.26    0.88 .385 
Sharedness of expertise perceptions Boot indirect effect Boot SE Boot z Boot p 
Conditional indirect effect at M ± 1SD 
-1 SD (-1.00) -0.18 0.16 -1.13 .258 
      M (0.00)    0.21 0.14   1.52 .128 
+1 SD (1.00)   0.60 0.29   2.09 .036 
Sharedness of expertise perceptionsa Boot indirect effect Boot SE Boot z Boot p 
Conditional indirect effect at range of values of the moderator (sharedness) 
  -.92 -0.15  0.15  -0.99  .321 
  -.69 -0.06  0.13  -0.46  .644 
  -.45   0.03  0.12    0.28  .783 
  -.22   0.12  0.12    1.02  .308 
    .01    0.21  0.14    1.54  .124 
    .24   0.30  0.17    1.82  .068 
    .47   0.39  0.20    1.97  .049 
    .70   0.48  0.24    2.05  .041 
    .93   0.57  0.27    2.09  .037 
 1.16   0.66  0.31    2.11  .035 
 1.39   0.75  0.35    2.12  .035 
Note: n=39 teams. The unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. Bootstrap sample size=5,000.   





Figure 4.2 Coordinated action predicted by reciprocal expertise affirmation and shared 
expertise perceptions. High=one standard deviation above the mean; Low=one standard 






Most important managerial, political, and military decisions are made by teams 
rather than by individuals. These teams address complex and ambiguous issues that 
involve large amounts of information and resources (Mason & Mitroff, 1981). The most 
critical resource of such teams is the combined expertise of all the individual team 
members. In order to effectively solve complex problems, members of these teams have to 
distinguish and acknowledge each other’s expertise and coordinate their individual 
contributions. Only when they effectively pool their knowledge can they create team 
knowledge structures that are larger than the sum of all members’ individual knowledge 
and perform optimally as a team (e.g., Faraj & Sproull, 2000). 
Unfortunately, many teams do not perform as well as one would expect based on the 
simple sum of the expertise of all the individual team members. For several reasons, team 
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members may fail to contribute their expertise, resulting in suboptimal team performance 
(Amason, 1996). The findings of our study suggest that an important factor that may 
determine whether team members are motivated to effectively contribute their expertise is 
their reciprocal expertise affirmation. The current study replicated the findings from 
Chapter 3 that, at the team level of analysis, reciprocal expertise affirmation functions as a 
cognitive antecedent of teams’ performance and that, since in teams the actions of 
individual team members have to be coordinated in order to achieve high overall team 
performance, we argued and showed that reciprocal expertise affirmation only results in 
high levels of team performance for teams with shared expertise perceptions, and that 
coordinated action mediates these effects (e.g., Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Wegner, 
1986).  
The findings of this study contribute to the teamwork literature by underlining the 
importance of the concept of reciprocal expertise affirmation. Although interest in cognitive 
determinants of team processes and performance has increased over recent decades, most 
research to date has focused on how variables related to social perception affect team 
functioning. This previous research has shown, for example, how team members’ shared 
perceptions of team- and task-related characteristics affect implicit and explicit 
coordination in work teams (see, for an overview, Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006). In the present 
study, we examined a distinct but important cognitive variable that influences the 
functioning of teams. We showed that, together with sharedness of expertise perceptions, 
reciprocal expertise affirmation influences a team’s coordinated action and performance. 
These findings help to better understand the effects of shared perceptions observed in 
earlier team research. While some of the previous studies confirmed the theoretically 
predicted positive relationship between shared perceptions and team coordination and 
performance (e.g., Anand, Manz, & Glick, 1998; Rentsch & Woehr, 2004), other studies 
found no relationship (e.g., Mathieu et al., 2000), or even a negative trend (e.g., Edwards, 
Day, Arthur, & Bell, 2006). Interestingly, in our study, we also failed to find a direct 
relationship between sharedness of expertise perceptions and either coordinated action or 
performance (see Table 4.2). These equivocal findings suggest the importance of other 
variables that may influence the relationship between a team’s sharedness of expertise 
perceptions and both coordinated action and team performance. Our findings suggest that 
it may be useful for team cognition research to not only focus on the effects of shared 





variables, such as reciprocal expertise affirmation, that may determine whether team 
members are motivated to share their knowledge and expertise. 
The present study naturally has both strengths and weaknesses, and the latter may 
warrant some caution in interpreting the results. First of all, although the use of student 
teams working on a four-week complex business simulation offered certain advantages in 
terms of access and control, particular characteristics of these teams could raise concerns 
about the generalizability of our findings to other team designs that are often used in 
practice. For example, in our setting the roles and types of expertise used were very clear as 
was the value and contribution of each role relative to the performance of the teams as a 
whole. In practice this is often less transparent or balanced for real teams working on 
complex problems where recognition of expertise would come in to play. Moreover, in 
contrast to most work teams in organizations, the teams in our sample were together for 
only four weeks, which may have produced a different pattern of interpersonal 
relationships between team members than one would observe in work teams within 
organizations. Also, we realize that four weeks of training do not make someone a real 
“expert” in the sense that he or she has the same amount of experience as someone who has 
fulfilled a particular role for years. In real teams people are, of course, much more identified 
with their expertise. However, we argue that this may even make our findings more 
compelling. After only a couple of weeks significant differences emerged between the teams 
with regard to reciprocal expertise affirmation and reciprocal expertise affirmation 
functioned as a strong motivational force that predicted performance processes and 
outcomes. Nevertheless, future research might further examine the generalizability of our 
findings to teams in ‘real-life’ organizations. 
A second possible limitation of the present study concerns measurement issues. 
First, in line with the social network tradition (e.g., Bowler & Brass, 2006) we used single-
item measures to assess our two independent variables. We opted for this approach 
because the demands placed on the respondents were already quite high; team members 
were working under time pressure and also had to report their expertise perceptions of 
and perceived expertise affirmation by all their fellow team members. Although some 
critics have argued against the use of single-item measures (Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991), 
there is a large volume of research suggesting that single-item measures can be highly 
reliable (e.g., Wanous & Hudy, 2001). For example, Bergkvist and Rossiter (2007) found no 
difference in the predictive validity of multiple-item and single-item measures of attitudes. 
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This is especially the case when a Round Robin design is used (which we do), because in 
this design every team member rates and is rated by every other team member resulting in 
multiple measurements and, thus, reducing error (Denissen, Geenen, Selfhout, & Van Aken, 
2008; Kenny, 1994). Every peer who contributes to this measure can be seen as an item in 
the psychometric sense of the word. Fortunately, our interrater-reliability indices indicated 
sufficient consistency in individual ratings of other team members. Moreover, we 
developed our items carefully, reframing the underlying theoretical construct in a 
straightforward way, as close as possible to the definition of the construct. For this reason, 
we believe that the items used are valid and reliable measures of the constructs studied and 
that our use of single-item measures does not invalidate our conclusions.  
Although a strength of the present study is that team performance was measured 
one week after the survey data were collected and was judged by external experts, time 
constraints on the part of the Supervisory Board precluded the use of anything more than a 
global performance assessment. Even though this overall team performance item is well-
known and validated in previous research (cf. Campion, Papper, & Medsker, 1996), future 
research should consider measuring different aspects of team performance (see e.g., 
Amason, 1996). A related limitation concerns the fact that team performance was rated 
after the teams had presented their business results and that we cannot rule out that 
presentation skills, impression management, or personality may have influenced these 
ratings. Even though this would not invalidate our findings, it might have inflated our 
results and we would, therefore, suggest future research to control for such factors. 
Given the paucity of empirical research into the effects of reciprocal expertise 
affirmation in teams, several interesting avenues for future research can be readily 
identified. First, we did not explicitly address the question as to whether or not the 
expertise perceptions of the participants in our study were accurate. Theoretically, it is 
quite possible that team members agree in their expertise perceptions but that they are 
inaccurate. While these constructs are theoretically distinguished in team cognition theory 
(cf. Austin, 2003) studies comparing perceptions of expertise with objective measures of it 
are rare because it is usually very hard to obtain objective information about individual 
team members’ qualities. However, research does suggest that team members’ perceptions 
of expertise are often quite accurate. Sullivan and Reno (1999), for example, found that 





peers. Nevertheless, future research might benefit from clearly distinguishing and 
measuring both concepts.  
Second, given the importance of reciprocal expertise affirmation in teams, future 
research might also further investigate the antecedents of reciprocal expertise affirmation. 
Research by Kenny (1994) shows that people often overestimate how transparent they are 
to others. People may generalize their beliefs about how others see them, rather than 
construing differential beliefs about how specific others see them. This suggests that 
individual perceptions of expertise affirmation by relevant others could be partly predicted 
by personality characteristics. Personality characteristics that may be related to such 
perceptions include need for approval (Leary, 1983) and self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974). 
Given their focus on how they are seen by others, one might expect such people to be more 
inclined than others to adapt their behavior to the expectations they think others may have 
of them. Such processes could be examined through longitudinal survey studies or video 
observations involving different types of teams. Additionally, it might be interesting to 
examine to what extent reciprocal expertise affirmation varies as a result of task 
characteristics. One could, for example, imagine that team members develop more dyad-
specific perceptions of expertise affirmation of those members with whom they frequently 
interact or with whom they are task and/or outcome interdependent (Van der Vegt, Van de 
Vliert, & Oosterhof, 2003).  
Third, previous research highlighted the effects of an individual’s perception of 
perceived expertise affirmation on individual-level processes and outcomes. In a team 
context, with the passage of time and as a result of social influence processes, team 
members may become more familiar with their teammates’ thought patterns (e.g., 
Harrison, Price, Gavin, & Florey, 2002), thereby increasing reciprocal expertise affirmation. 
Since our study shows that reciprocal expertise affirmation is related to team performance 
it becomes interesting to study the development and dynamics of reciprocal expertise 
affirmation in teams by means of longitudinal studies. Such research may, for example, give 
directions to interventions to improve team development or to interventions that facilitate 
the socialization of newcomers. 
Finally, our study examined inter-team differences in reciprocal expertise 
affirmation and their implications for team-level functioning and effectiveness. However, in 
team research it is not only important to look at team-level processes and outcomes, but 
also to examine lower-level processes and outcomes occurring in a team context because 
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they may sometimes indicate similar or different patterns of relationships across levels of 
analysis (cf. Chen, Thomas, & Wallace, 2005; Sonnentag & Volmer, 2010). Because team 
members’ perceptions of expertise affirmation are fundamentally relational phenomena, it 
would be especially interesting to take a closer look at the origin and effects of these 
variables at the dyad level of analysis. It might be interesting, for example, to examine 
whether individuals are especially likely to help those team members whom they think are 
most aware of their expertise and how, in turn, this affects individual and team 
performance.  
Although much work still needs to be done, the results of the present research may 
have practical implications. First of all, our results suggest that teams will function best 
when reciprocal expertise affirmation is high and the team has developed shared 
perceptions of expertise. Therefore, it is important to assess both factors before planning 
an intervention to improve team processes and output. Reciprocal expertise affirmation 
could be enhanced by cross-training since this teaches team members the specific tasks and 
content of each member’s roles. In this way, team members experience the problems each 
one of them encounters while performing their tasks. As a result, team members may 
believe that their fellow members are better able to judge their strengths and weaknesses, 
thus enhancing reciprocal expertise affirmation. The team leader might also be in a position 
to facilitate an increase in reciprocal expertise affirmation. For example, transformational 
leaders (e.g., Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1990) give all team members 
individual support and feedback. If this were to happen in a team setting, in which all 
members’ qualifications were openly discussed, this could increase team members’ mutual 
recognition that others are aware of their expertise.  
  Second, research has shown that, over time, team members’ expertise perceptions of 
each other do not necessarily become more shared (e.g., Levesque, Wilson, & Wholey, 
2001). However, it may be relatively easy to increase the sharedness of expertise 
perceptions; this will occur if team members have the opportunity to learn about each 
other’s expertise through frequent interactions. Task and outcome interdependence 
between team members have been shown to increase the extent to which team members 
interact and help each other (Van der Vegt et al., 2003). Therefore, team leaders might tune 
these task characteristics in order to improve the sharedness of expertise perceptions. The 
reverse intervention, however, may also be an option. Take away the interdependence 





seriously damage the team performance outcomes. In that case one may, of course, 
question if, in terms of Hackman (2002), one can still speak of a ‘real team’. Task 
interdependence among workers can be reduced by assigning broader tasks to individuals.   
A final implication for practice may be an additional encouragement to support the 
socialization of newcomers by consciously helping them catch up with the old-timers’ 
knowledge about one another. It also seems important to make newcomers believe that the 
other team members are being made aware of their expertise. For example, the team leader 
could intervene during team meetings by explaining how newcomers’ expertise relates to 
that of the old-timers and what previous experience a newcomer has. Of course, newcomers 
may also present themselves during a meeting.  
Conclusion 
  To conclude, our study replicates the finding from Chapter 3 that reciprocal 
expertise affirmation is an important cognitive variable for teamwork. In team settings the 
actions of individual team members have to be coordinated in order to achieve high overall 
team performance. Our findings showed that reciprocal expertise affirmation only results 
in high levels of team performance if team members share expertise perceptions, and that 










In spite of the importance of meta-perceptions – i.e. people’s beliefs of how others 
see them (Kenny, 1994) – as determinants of people’s behavior, little attention has been 
paid to meta-perceptions in work settings. More specifically, a review of the empirical 
meta-perception literature in Chapter 1 revealed three gaps. First, research on meta-
perceptions in a work setting and especially in work teams, is scarce. Second, the content of 
meta-perceptions mostly refers to (pathopsychological) personality or stereotypes, but 
seldom to task-related characteristics. Third, little structural empirical knowledge exists 
regarding the effects of meta-perceptions. Because of these voids and the trend in the last 
decennia for organizations to organize work around teams (e.g., Devine, Clayton, Philips, 
Dunford, & Melner, 1999), the present dissertation focused on the role of task-related meta-
perceptions in work teams. In work teams, expertise is the most important task-related 
resource (Faraj & Sproull, 2000) as well as a crucial positive aspect of team members’ work 
identity (Van der Vegt & Bunderson, 2005). Therefore, and because research has suggested 
that the affirmation of positive identities is a crucial motivational force (e.g., Dutton, 
Roberts, & Bednar, 2010), I zoomed in on perceived expertise affirmation – i.e. the belief 
that one’s expertise is recognized and acknowledged by one’s fellow team members. 
 In this final chapter I reflect on the findings regarding this construct, on its 
development, and on its consequences at both the individual as well as the team level of 
analysis. In the following, I first describe the main findings of the three empirical studies 
reported in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Next, I discuss the theoretical implications that can be 
derived from the findings of these studies. Subsequently, I address the strengths and 
limitations of the present research and offer some suggestions for future research. I finish 
with practical implications and some concluding remarks.  
Summary of the Main Findings 
The results of the three empirical studies in this dissertation can be summarized in 
four main findings. First, the present research suggests that perceived expertise affirmation 
is a valid multi-level construct that is relevant in team settings at both the individual 
(perceived expertise affirmation) as well as the team level of analysis (reciprocal expertise 
affirmation). Second, these empirical findings shed light on the development of perceived 
expertise affirmation by identifying two individual-level antecedents (educational 





and team longevity). Third, these findings show that both perceived expertise affirmation 
and reciprocal expertise affirmation are positively related to individual performance. 
Fourth, reciprocal expertise affirmation is conditionally positively related to team 
performance; this relationship is contingent on the team’s sharedness of expertise 
perceptions and is mediated by coordinated action. The empirical findings of the present 
dissertation are graphically summarized in Figure 5.1. 
Finding 1: Perceived expertise affirmation is a valid multi-level construct  
In order to be able to examine the development and consequences of perceived 
expertise affirmation and reciprocal expertise affirmation it was important to first develop 
a measure. Therefore, in Chapter 2, I spent ample time to develop and validate a measure 
using the framework of Chen, Mathieu, and Bliese (2004) for multi-level construct 
validation. The findings from Chapter 2 confirmed the idea that in addition to differences in 
perceived expertise affirmation between individuals, meaningful differences between teams 
emerge in the belief that expertise is affirmed by fellow members –i.e. reciprocal expertise 
affirmation (cf. MacPhail, Roloff, & Edmondson, 2009). This emergence of a higher level 
team-construct out of individual team members’ perceptions of expertise affirmation was 
replicated in Chapters 3 and 4 using other samples. The fact that these samples varied from 
student teams working on a four-week business simulation to employees from 
organizational work teams from a wide range of industry sectors makes this finding 
especially robust. This replication in two other samples suggests that the development of 
perceived expertise affirmation and reciprocal expertise affirmation can be expected to 
occur in different types of team contexts.  
Chapter 2 also provided evidence that perceived expertise affirmation and 
reciprocal expertise affirmation are unique constructs that can be theoretically and 
empirically distinguished from related constructs at the individual level (self-efficacy and 
team-based self-esteem), and team level of analysis (credibility and psychological safety). 
This partial nomological network confirmed the convergent and divergent validity of 
perceived and reciprocal expertise affirmation and paved the way for the study of their 
antecedents and consequences of in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Finding 2: Individual and team-level development of expertise affirmation beliefs 
 After establishing a valid measure of the focal construct, I proceeded with the next 
step: examining its antecedents. Chapter 3 provides some insight into how expertise 




similarity would increase perceived expertise affirmation through heightened levels of 
interaction (e.g., Chatman, Polzer, Barsade, & Neale, 1998) and felt transparency (Frey & 
Tropp, 2006). Relative expertise, as a proxy of status (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972), was 
argued to increase team members’ visibility and speaking time (e.g., Shelly & Troyer, 2001), 
and, in turn, the extent to which they think fellow members are aware of their expertise. At 
the individual level of analysis, I indeed found that educational background similarity and 
relative expertise were positive predictors of perceived expertise affirmation.  
In Chapter 3 I also identified two team-level antecedents. Team size was a negative 
predictor of reciprocal expertise affirmation, whereas team longevity was a positive 
predictor. So, opportunities for team members to learn about each other’s strengths and 
weaknesses, whether it be due to more time, or more intense contact due to a smaller team, 
seem crucial for the development of reciprocal expertise affirmation. However, I also 
included team size as a control variable in Chapter 4, and did not replicate the negative 
relationship between team size and reciprocal expertise affirmation (see Table 4.1.). One 
explanation for this may be the small differences in team size in the sample I used in 
Chapter 4. That is, in the latter sample the sizes of the teams were all between five and 
seven members (M=5.95; SD=.65), whereas in the sample in Chapter 3, team sizes varied 
between three and twenty members. Even though the average team size is almost the same 
for both samples (M=6.07) the standard deviation in the Chapter 4 sample is more than 5 
times as high (SD=3.19). Unfortunately, it was not possible to test for the effect of longevity 
in Chapter 4, because teams in this sample were all created at the same time, and all 
worked together for four weeks. In conclusion, in Chapter 3, a number of important 
antecedents of perceived expertise affirmation and reciprocal expertise affirmation were 
identified.  
Finding 3: Consequences for individual performance  
One of the main goals of this dissertation was to examine whether people’s beliefs 
that their fellow team members affirm their expertise indeed have positive implications for 
their individual performance. The findings in Chapter 3 confirmed this expectation 
suggesting that perceived expertise affirmation is a strong motivational force in work 
teams. Moreover, over and above the direct positive relationship between perceived 
expertise affirmation and individual team member performance, reciprocal expertise 
affirmation also positively predicted individual team member’s performance. This 





affirmation are positively related, because the basis for the latter lies in the perceptions of 
the individual members, both constructs may nevertheless vary independently and 
independently predict individual member’s performance.  
Finding 4: Reciprocal expertise affirmation and team performance 
The empirical findings in Chapter 3 show that, as predicted, reciprocal expertise 
affirmation was positively related to team performance, but only in teams with high levels 
of shared expertise perceptions. These findings suggest that the implications of expertise 
affirmation beliefs for team performance are less straightforward than those for individual 
performance. High team performance requires that individual contributions to the 
collective are somehow coordinated (Rico, Sánchez-Manzanares, Gil, & Gibson, 2008; Van 
de Ven, Delbecq, & Koenig, 1976). The findings from Chapter 3 suggest that sharedness of 
expertise perceptions can function as such a coordination mechanism and help team 
members to align their individual efforts and perform optimally as a team. As a result, 
reciprocal expertise affirmation only enhances team performance if the team members 
have shared perceptions of each other’s’ expertise. This interactive effect was replicated in 
Chapter 4. Moreover, I extended this finding by showing that the joint effects of teams’ 
reciprocal expertise affirmation and sharedness of expertise perceptions on team 
performance were mediated by coordinated action. These findings suggest that teams not 
only need hard-working team members, due to reciprocal expertise affirmation, but also an 
implicit coordination mechanism to align individuals’ contributions toward the same goal 
and that this combination results in higher level of team performance through coordinated 
action (e.g., Faraj, & Sproull, 2000). 
Theoretical Implications 
The main goal of the present dissertation was to examine the role of meta-
perceptions in work settings by focusing on a specific type of meta-perceptions: perceived 
expertise affirmation in work teams. The results of the three empirical studies I conducted 
have a number of theoretical implications for research and theory building regarding the 
role of meta-perceptions of expertise in work teams.  
First of all, the results presented in the three studies demonstrate the importance of 
task-related meta-perceptions in work teams. It is surprising how little research has thus 
far focused on such meta-perceptions at work, let alone in work teams. The present 
research answers calls from MacPhail et al. (2009) to study perceived expertise affirmation 




hope to stimulate future research on this topic. Moreover, the development of a partial 
nomological network and the identification of a number of key antecedents is an important 
initial step for future research.  
Second, the empirical studies in the present dissertation consistently suggest that 
meta-perceptions have important implications for the functioning and performance of work 
teams. These findings corroborate theory in a relatively new branch of literature that 
underlines the importance of recognition of positive identities at work for employees’ 
motivation (e.g., Dutton et al., 2010). Unfortunately, this literature is still of a largely 
theoretical nature. The findings in the present dissertation show that it is important to 
adopt a multi-level approach when empirically studying positive identities at work. This is 
in line with, for example, Ashforth, Rogers, & Corley (2011) who argue that at the individual 
level, identity addresses psychological motives such as learning about the self, maintaining 
integrity between self and behavior, and attaining a positive sense of self. In contrast, at the 
group level, identity has been argued to define the group and differentiate it from relevant 
other groups, providing a foundation for member commitment to the group and action on 
behalf of the group (e.g., Haslam & Ellemers 2005). The differences I found in the 
development of and consequences of perceptions of expertise affirmation at two levels of 
analyses, may signal different affirmation processes of positive identity (such as expertise). 
For example, members of a project team may develop a sense of affirmation of “who we 
are” as a team (e.g., “in this team members are aware of each other’s’ expertise”), while 
simultaneously constructing a sense of affirmation of “who I am” (e.g., fellow team 
members are aware of my expertise”). With the present dissertation I have tried to show 
that explicitly distinguishing between the individual and the team level can function as a 
starting point for theory and studies to further the knowledge of the importance of positive 
identities for team work.  
Third, even though a growing number of studies in the last decades has focused on 
cognitive predictors of team performance such as shared mental models and transactive 
memory (see Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006 for an overview), the potential effects of meta-
perceptions have been mainly ignored. Shared mental models and transactive memory are 
important in helping team members coordinate their actions and to give insight into 
knowledge systems within teams. However, these cognitive constructs do not account for 
the potential motivational force inherent in cognition. The findings of the present 





Therefore, it may be useful for team cognition research to acknowledge the importance of 
other cognitive variables in predicting team functioning, such as meta-perceptions, that 
may determine whether team members are motivated to share their knowledge and 
expertise (Oosterhof, Van der Vegt, Van de Vliert, & Sanders, 2009).  
Strengths, Limitations and Future Research 
 The present dissertation has several strengths that reinforce the findings I discussed 
above. First, an important strength of the present dissertation is the fact that I conducted 
studies in field settings as well as in a more controlled environment. This supports the 
generalizability of the findings and increases their external validity. Second, to prevent 
common source variance, I gathered data from different sources (e.g., demographics, peer 
ratings, self-reports, and supervisor ratings). Third, in all three studies I measured the 
study variables at different points in time. This temporal separation of the measurement of 
the predictor and criterion variables minimized artificial covariation between our study 
variables (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). A final strength is the high 
response rate in all three studies which minimizes selection biases in the study 
participants.  
As with any research, the present dissertation also has a number of weaknesses. For 
the specific limitations of the empirical studies, I refer to the relevant chapter. Below, I will 
mention three overall limitations. First of all, even though a number of key variables and 
antecedents were addressed in relation to the focal construct at both levels of analysis, 
research on expertise affirmation beliefs is still in its infancy. Further efforts should focus 
on an elaboration of the nomological network of expertise affirmation beliefs at both levels 
of analysis. At the individual level of analysis it would be interesting to examine a number 
of personality variables. For example, one could expect that perceived expertise affirmation 
has stronger effects for people with a high need for approval (Leary, 1983) or who score 
high on self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) because of their focus on how they are seen by 
others. One might expect such people to be more inclined than others to adapt their 
behavior to the expectations they think others may have of them. Additionally, it might be 
interesting to empirically distinguish reciprocal expertise affirmation from other cognitive 
team constructs such as transactive memory systems (Wegner, 1986) or types of team 
climates such as collective efficacy (Stajkovic, Lee, & Nyberg, 2009). 
A second limitation is the fact that even though the antecedents were related to the 




empirically examined. For example, the argumentation that in larger teams there would be 
less interpersonal interaction and information exchange (Williams & O'Reilly, 1998) and 
lower visibility of individual contributions to the group product (Kameda, Stasson, Davis, 
Parks, & Zimmerman, 1992) is speculative. Also the team-level processes through which 
reciprocal expertise may enhance team performance under certain conditions require more 
attention in future research. One could, for example, expect that in teams with high levels of 
reciprocal expertise affirmation psychological safety is more likely to arise, facilitating 
discussions in which members bring their expertise to bear, share problems and mistakes 
and try to help each other with advice or creative solutions (cf. MacPhail et al., 2009). 
However, this explanation, too, requires additional testing.  
Third, even though the overall conceptual model in Figure 5.1. suggests a 
mediational effect of perceived expertise affirmation and reciprocal expertise affirmation, 
this was not examined in the present dissertation. The reason for this omission is that most 
the antecedents of perceived expertise affirmation and reciprocal expertise affirmation we 
examined (educational background similarity, team longevity, and team size) are 
theoretically rather remote from performance, and there is no theoretical reason to assume 
a clear relationship. In future research it might be interesting to examine a number of 
antecedents that are theoretically closer to individual and/or team performance in order to 
gain more insight in the relevant processes.  
Fourth, I only examined one aspect of a person’s positive identity affirmation, 
namely his or her expertise. However, expertise may not always be the most salient 
individual characteristic to a person. For example, someone may find it more important 
that others affirm his or her warmth or interpersonal competences. Imagine an engineering 
team in which someone performs well, and thinks that others are aware of his task-related 
expertise. However, he may not feel valued as a person because he is never invited to the 
annual barbecue night of one of the members. Even though this team member may believe 
that his expertise is affirmed he may feel that he is just not fully part of the team. It would 
be interesting for future research to examine which individual characteristics people find 
the most important dimensions to be affirmed by their fellow team members and 
subsequently ask to what extent this is the case. Moreover, Felson (1985) established that 
the inﬂuence of meta-perceptions on the self may be different depending upon the type of 





related to the children’s evaluation by peers (e.g., physical attractiveness) affected their 
self-view much more than other types of meta-perception (e.g., academic achievement). 
Fifth, the designs of the three empirical studies in the present dissertation were of a 
cross-sectional nature and did not allow us to explicitly test the direction of causality of the 
proposed relationships. The relationship between individual perceived expertise 
affirmation and supervisor-rated individual performance, for example, could be opposite to 
what I have suggested. It is possible that individual team members may report higher levels 
of perceived expertise affirmation after they receive positive performance evaluations from 
their supervisors. Alternatively, and perhaps even more realistically, reciprocal 
relationships may exist between the study variables. A longitudinal research design in 
which the variables of interest are all measured at two or more periods in time is needed to 
address such issues. If possible, further studies should also use additional methods that 
complement ours. It might be interesting to conduct several studies in a laboratory setting 
to examine the underlying mechanisms that drive the effects of expertise affirmation 
beliefs. This will help to gather more detailed knowledge regarding the underlying 
processes within groups or between individuals regarding the development and effects of 
perceptions of expertise affirmation. For example, an experiment will allow for the 
manipulation of different task characteristics such as task interdependence or task 
complexity to see under which conditions the development of expertise affirmation beliefs 
is fastest. It might be, for example, that complex tasks require more interactions between 
individual team members and that this speeds-up the development of perceived expertise 
affirmation and reciprocal expertise affirmation. 
Practical Implications 
The findings reported in the present dissertation have implications for how 
practitioners may effectively manage teams. First, in order to increase individual 
performance of team members it seems important to heighten the levels of expertise 
affirmation beliefs for individuals as well as for teams as a whole. Managers can fulfill an 
important role in the development of a team climate, for example by encouraging team 
members to speak up and give short presentations of their relevant specialized knowledge 
for a specific team goal. The team leader may also stress the importance of clarification 
during team discussions and problem solving. For example, transformational leaders (e.g., 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1990) can give all team members individual 




are openly discussed, this could increase team members’ mutual recognition that others are 
aware of their expertise. Another potential interesting way is for leaders to take on the role 
of mediators in teams to help clear up misunderstandings, mediate conflict, and translate 
specialist jargon. Okhuysen and Eisenhardt (2002) found that teams were more likely to 
use and combine knowledge effectively when formal interventions encouraged team 
members to ask questions about one another’s knowledge.  
Finally, some tools and interventions may help to increase reciprocal expertise 
affirmation. Interventions such as cross-training and team building activities may ease 
team members’ evaluative concerns (see Gaertner et al., 1999). Also, one may consider 
interventions aimed at stressing unique individual skills while making clear how these are 
indispensable for team performance as a whole. Team meetings in which all members have 
time to discuss their strengths and weaknesses in relevant domains and how these are 
related to the team tasks and outcomes may be useful in this regard. One could do so by 
using visualization techniques such as mind-maps and sticky notes. Also, teams may create 
a “community” on intranet in which members keep a log of their progress, their successes 
and the problems they encounter. For example, an engineering team working on 
calculations for a bridge may post comments about the assumptions they used regarding 
the forces this bridge would encounter in the future (wind/rain strain etc.). Other 
employees can jump in and add their remarks. All comments and advice are tracked 
chronologically, by subject and date. This can give team members a sense of visibility of 
their contributions, increasing their expertise affirmation beliefs. Such interventions may 
increase the development of a climate of reciprocal expertise affirmation within a team. 
However, future research should first address which interventions actually increase 
reciprocal expertise affirmation. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This dissertation started with an example of the importance of people’s beliefs of 
whether others are aware of their task-related knowledge, skills and abilities in teams. In 
spite of anecdotal evidence, little research had empirically examined the development and 
consequences of these beliefs for team work. The multi-level approach in the three 
empirical studies that I conducted, provide support that this so-called perceived expertise 
affirmation is important for individual performance as well as team performance. This 
dissertation was a first step in examining if, how, and when such beliefs of expertise 





realm of organizational behavior, the findings of the present dissertation support the 
notion that researchers as well as managers may need to focus on the individual and team-
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SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
Mensen zijn van nature nieuwsgierig en geïnteresseerd in hoe ze op anderen 
overkomen. In het dagelijkse sociale verkeer denken ze dan ook regelmatig na over 
welke indruk ze bij anderen achterlaten. Gedachtes en ideeën over hoe iemand denkt 
door anderen te worden gezien (“Ik denk dat zij me aardig vindt”) worden meta-
percepties genoemd, oftewel percepties van percepties. Ondanks de bewezen effecten 
van meta-percepties op menselijk gedrag en gevoel in allerlei verschillende situaties, is 
er verrassend weinig bekend over meta-percepties op de werkvloer. Bovendien werken 
werknemers steeds vaker in teamverband, waardoor ze intensief met elkaar moeten 
samenwerken en dergelijke percepties een grotere rol gaan spelen. Hierdoor wordt het 
steeds belangrijker om inzicht te verkrijgen in de ontwikkeling en effecten van meta-
percepties in teams.  
Een bijzonder soort meta-perceptie is erkenning van expertise – het idee dat je 
kennis en vaardigheden worden herkend en op waarde worden geschat door de rest 
van je team. Medewerkers zitten doorgaans in een team vanwege hun specifieke 
expertise (“We hebben nog een financiële man nodig in dat team, kan Piet daar niet aan 
toegevoegd worden?”). Deze expertise is één van de belangrijkste sociale categorieën die 
de identiteit van teamleden bepalen (“Zij is econoom.”), of juist niet (“Nee, zij is geen 
organisatiepsycholoog.”). Expertise is iemands totaal aan talenten, kwaliteiten en 
vaardigheden opgebouwd door opleiding en werkervaring en is een positieve 
eigenschap; mensen zijn trots op wat ze kunnen en weten en ontlenen hier een deel van 
hun eigenwaarde aan. Om die reden kan verwacht worden dat erkenning van expertise 
teamleden het gevoel geeft bijzonder te zijn en een belangrijke bijdrage te kunnen 
leveren aan het team en daarom sterk motiverend werkt. 
Helaas is hier nog maar weinig empirisch onderzoek naar verricht. Daarom richt 
ik mij in dit proefschrift op erkenning van expertise: de percepties van medewerkers 
dat hun expertise wordt herkend en op waarde wordt geschat door hun teamgenoten. 
In drie studies heb ik geprobeerd de volgende vragen te beantwoorden: Hoe ontwikkelt 
erkenning van expertise zich in een team en wat zijn de gevolgen hiervan voor 
individuele teamleden en voor teams in hun geheel?  
In Hoofdstuk 1 geef ik een overzicht van de meta-perceptieliteratuur. De 
empirische artikelen die een zoektocht naar de termen “meta-perception” en 





psychologische literatuur: intergroepsrelaties, interpersoonlijke percepties, intieme 
relaties en klinische psychologie. Dit overzicht legt een drietal lacunes bloot in de meta-
perceptieliteratuur met betrekking tot, respectievelijk, de setting, de inhoud en de 
effecten van de onderzochte meta-percepties. Ten eerste valt op dat onderzoek naar 
meta-percepties op de werkvloer en, met name, in werkteams nagenoeg ontbreekt. Ten 
tweede hebben de weinige studies naar meta-percepties op het werk overwegend 
betrekking op persoonlijkheidskenmerken of stereotypes en nauwelijks op 
taakrelevante eigenschappen. Ten derde is er een gebrek aan empirische kennis van de 
effecten van meta-percepties. Als een eerste aanzet tot het vullen van deze lacunes, richt 
ik mij om die redenen op erkenning van expertise als een vorm van taakgerelateerde 
meta-percepties in werkteams.  
Om de ontwikkeling en effecten van erkenning van expertise te onderzoeken, 
moet het concept eerst helder worden gedefinieerd en meetbaar worden gemaakt. 
Daarom is Hoofdstuk 2 gewijd aan de constructie en validatie van een schaal op zowel 
individueel als teamniveau. Het idee achter deze multi-level benadering is de 
verwachting dat vanuit individuele erkenning van expertise (“Ik denk dat de andere 
teamleden goed op de hoogte zijn van mijn kennis en vaardigheden”) een teamgedachte 
met dezelfde inhoud kan ontstaan. Deze teamgedachte wordt reciproke erkenning van 
expertise genoemd en houdt in dat teamleden impliciete overeenstemming bereiken 
over de mate waarin ze het gevoel hebben dat hun expertise binnen hun team wordt 
herkend en gewaardeerd. Dit houdt in dat er niet alleen variatie zou zijn in de hoogte 
van erkenning van expertise binnen teams (Jan kan bijvoorbeeld het idee hebben dat 
andere teamleden nauwelijks op de hoogte zijn van zijn expertise, terwijl zijn 
teamgenoot Klaas die erkenning juist wel ervaart), maar ook tussen teams. (In het ene 
team kunnen teamleden sterk het gevoel hebben dat anderen op de hoogte zijn van wat 
ze kunnen en weten, maar in het andere team helemaal niet.)  
Om deze ideeën te toetsen valideer ik de ontwikkelde items voor het construct 
erkenning van expertise op zowel individueel als teamniveau met behulp van data uit 
een vragenlijststudie onder 155 hogeropgeleide werknemers in teams van Nederlandse 
organisaties uit diverse bedrijfssectoren. In een individuele confirmatieve factoranalyse 
laat ik zien dat erkenning van expertise verschilt van gerelateerde constructen als self-
efficacy en teambased self-esteem. De confirmatieve factoranalyse op teamniveau 





raakvlakken vertoont met de constructen psychologische veiligheid en 
geloofwaardigheid, maar daar ook duidelijk van verschilt. Kortom, de bevindingen uit 
Hoofdstuk 2 laten zien dat erkenning van expertise en reciproke erkenning van 
expertise twee unieke constructen zijn die theoretisch en empirisch verschillen van 
elkaar en van gerelateerde constructen op zowel individueel als teamniveau. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 bouw ik voort op de inzichten van Hoofdstuk 2 en toets ik een 
nomologisch netwerk van erkenning van expertise in een dataset van 86 teams 
bestaande uit 400 hogeropgeleide medewerkers en hun teamleiders. Ik beargumenteer 
en toon aan dat het relatieve expertiseniveau van individuele teamleden ten opzichte 
van de rest van het team en overeenkomst in opleidingsachtergrond met de andere 
teamleden positieve voorspellers zijn van erkenning van expertise.  
Expertise is in een team één van de belangrijkste basis voor het verkrijgen van 
status. Hoe meer expertise een teamlid bezit, des te meer status hij of zij vergaart. 
Eerder onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat teamleden met veel status meer spreektijd 
krijgen dan teamleden met weinig status en dat hun acties en uitingen meer aandacht 
krijgen. Deze extra aandacht zou teamleden met relatief hoge expertiseniveaus het idee 
geven dat de andere teamleden hun expertise erkennen, terwijl teamleden met relatief 
lage expertiseniveaus dit idee minder krijgen.  
Het idee achter gelijkheid in opleidingsachtergrond als tweede positieve 
voorspeller van individuele erkenning van expertise komt uit de diversiteitsliteratuur. 
Uit eerder onderzoek is gebleken dat naarmate mensen gelijker zijn aan anderen, ze 
denken dat die anderen hen beter kennen en ze transparanter voor hen zijn. Analoog 
hieraan verwachtte ik dat mensen aannemen dat ze transparanter zijn voor mensen met 
een zelfde opleidingsachtergrond dan voor mensen die hierin verschillen. Mijn 
resultaten tonen inderdaad aan dat een zelfde opleidingsachtergrond leidt tot meer 
erkenning van expertise.  
Bovendien zijn erkenning van expertise en reciproke erkenning van expertise 
beide onafhankelijk van elkaar positieve voorspellers van individuele prestatie zoals 
gescoord door de leidinggevende. Individuele teamleden die hoog scoren op erkenning 
van expertise of die in een team zitten waarin alle leden elkaars expertise herkennen en 
waarderen (reciproke erkenning van expertise) presteren beter.  
Op teamniveau bevestig ik mijn verwachting dat kleine teams hoger scoren op 





grote teams en kunnen ze gemakkelijker aan anderen laten zien wat ze kunnen. Zoals 
verwacht ontwikkelen teamleden in kleine teams eerder het gevoel dat anderen op de 
hoogte zijn van hun expertise.  
Ook toon ik aan dat teams die relatief lang bestaan hoger scoren op reciproke 
erkenning van expertise. De lengte van de samenwerking als team is een proxy voor hoe 
goed teamleden elkaar kennen. Hoe langer teams bestaan, des te meer de leden van 
zichzelf hebben kunnen laten zien.  
 Als laatste laat ik in dit hoofdstuk zien dat een hoger niveau van reciproke 
erkenning van expertise positieve gevolgen heeft voor de prestatie van het team, maar 
dat dit alleen geldt voor teams met een goed coördinatiemechanisme om de activiteiten 
van de teamleden op elkaar af te stemmen.   
In Hoofdstuk 4, onderzoek ik hoe en wanneer reciproke erkenning van expertise 
teamprestaties verbetert in een andere setting, namelijk bij 226 leden van 39 teams die 
meededen aan een Management Game. Allereerst repliceer ik de resultaten uit 
Hoofdstuk 3 dat reciproke erkenning van expertise positief is gerelateerd aan 
teamprestatie, maar alleen in teams met een goed coördinatiemechanisme. Vervolgens 
breid ik dit model uit door aan te tonen dat de gezamenlijke effecten van reciproke 
erkenning van expertise en een goed coördinatiemechanisme op teamprestatie worden 
gemedieerd door gecoördineerde actie. Met andere woorden, teams waarin de leden het 
idee hebben dat hun expertise wordt gewaardeerd, presteren significant beter dan 
teams waarin dit minder het geval is. Maar niet altijd. Als teamleden hun taken niet goed 
onderling coördineren, maakt het niet uit of ze zich gewaardeerd voelen en daardoor 
harder werken, omdat werk dan dubbel wordt gedaan of blijft liggen. Een voorbeeld 
hiervan is een cross-functioneel team waarin de marketingmanager hard werkt aan een 
nieuwe marketingstrategie om de vraag naar producten te doen stijgen zonder met de 
productiemanager af te stemmen of de productieafdeling deze verhoogde capaciteit wel 
aan zou kunnen. In dat geval kunnen alle betrokkenen nog zoveel erkenning van 
expertise ervaren en daardoor gemotiveerder en harder werken, als ze hun taken niet 
op elkaar afstemmen zal dat geen effect sorteren voor de gecoördineerde actie van het 
team en voor de teamprestatie. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 integreer ik de gevonden resultaten van de bovengenoemde 
studies en eindig met enkele aanbevelingen voor de praktijk. De bevindingen 





teamresultaten cruciaal is dat teamleden zich gewaardeerd voelen door hun 
teamgenoten. Deze bevinding onderstreept het belang van goed 
waarderingsmanagement binnen organisaties. Tegelijkertijd is erkenning van expertise 
en de daaruit voortkomende motivatie alleen niet voldoende voor een goede 
teamprestatie, maar moeten teams bovendien beschikken over een goed 
coördinatiemechanisme. Teamleden kunnen nog zo gemotiveerd zijn en hard werken, 
maar als ze om wat voor reden dan ook hun activiteiten niet goed op elkaar afstemmen, 
zal het team onvoldoende de vruchten kunnen plukken van hun inspanningen.  
Managers kunnen hier rekening mee houden door aandacht te besteden aan de 
socialisatie van nieuwkomers en hen ruimte te bieden om hun kwaliteiten te 
demonstreren door bijvoorbeeld een presentatie te houden over een goed afgeronde 
klus. Het idee gewaardeerd te worden kan mogelijk vergroot worden door cross-
training. Dit houdt in dat teamleden korte tijd elkaars taken vervullen en daarin 
getraind worden. Zo krijgen ze meer kennis over elkaars werk en kwaliteiten en begrip 
voor eventuele moeilijkheden in het uitoefenen van bepaalde taken. Daarnaast is het 
belangrijk dat teams een goed coördinatiemechanisme ontwikkelen en iedereen goed 
op de hoogte is van wie waar goed in is, zodat taken niet dubbel half of helemaal niet 
gebeuren door afstemmingsproblemen. Een manager kan dit bevorderen door de 
teamleden meer afhankelijk van elkaar te maken met betrekking tot zowel hun taken als 








 8 buitenlandse congressen, 7 vakgroepuitjes, 6 waterpolotoernooien, 5 cavia’s, 4 
verkeringen, 3 begeleiders, 2 publicaties =>1 proefschrift.  
 “Wanneer hebben we een feestje?” Elke keer dat mij deze vraag werd gesteld, 
antwoordde ik dat het bijna zover was. En nu is het dan ECHT zo ver. Na acht jaar als 
aio, docent en universitair docent bij de vakgroep HRM & Organizational Behavior te 
hebben gewerkt is mijn “boekje” af. 
 Bij de totstandkoming van dit proefschrift zijn veel mensen betrokken die ik 
dank ben verschuldigd. Allereerst bedank ik mijn begeleiders: Gerben van der Vegt, Eric 
Molleman en Etty Jehn. Als kersverse arbeids- en organisatiepsycholoog volgde ik 
Gerben naar Bedrijfskunde voor een promotieonderzoek naar teams. Gerben, bedankt 
voor deze kans, je betrokkenheid en je onvoorwaardelijke vertrouwen. De 
onvermijdelijke momenten dat ik me wel eens afvroeg of mijn proefschrift ooit af zou 
komen, reageerde je verbaasd: “Daar heb ik nog nooit aan getwijfeld, jij wel dan?!” Eric, 
veel dank voor de contactmomenten, je stabiliteit en razendsnelle feedback. Als 
leidinggevende ga je door het vuur voor je werknemers en zorg je dat hen veel 
bureaucratische rompslomp en gedoe bespaard blijft. Dit waardeer ik enorm. Etty, 
thank you for being my third promotor and for your hospitality during my visit in 
Melbourne. 
 Next, I would like to thank the reading committee, Professor Onne Janssen, 
Professor Stuart Bunderson en Professor Karen van Oudenhoven-van der Zee. Thank 
you for taking the time to read and evaluate my dissertation. Karen, voor mij is het extra 
bijzonder dat jij deel uitmaakt van de leescommissie. Je was mijn afstudeerbegeleider 
bij psychologie en bent een voorbeeld voor me. Bedankt voor je geloof in mij. Jij hebt mij 
in de praktijk laten zien hoe motiverend erkenning van expertise kan werken. 
 Alle collega’s van HRM & OB wil ik van harte bedanken voor de fijne en open 
werksfeer met als hoogtepunt onze reis naar Istanbul. Naast alle inhoudelijke 
gesprekken en discussies over methodes, statistiek en theorie, was er veel ruimte voor 
gezelligheid en humor. Veel collega’s zijn in de loop der jaren vrienden geworden en een 
aantal wil ik dan ook in het bijzonder bedanken. Aio’s van het eerste uur Marian, Aad, 





interessante discussies die we voerden als onderdeel van onze onderzoeks- en 
leesgroep. Inge † ook al was het veel te kort, je intelligente humor was onnavolgbaar en 
zal ik nooit vergeten. Sanne en Gerdien, de laatste jaren liep ik regelmatig bij jullie 
binnen om even stoom af te blazen of iets op jullie whiteboard te tekenen. Dank voor 
jullie relativeringsvermogen en gezelligheid. Sanne, sinds ik in Den Haag woon, ben ik 
mijn tennismaat kwijt. Met veel plezier heb ik alle keren (bijna) van je gewonnen en 
voor revanche ben je welkom in Den Haag. Dennis en Roy, de roadtrip met jullie rond 
Lake Erie was onvergetelijk. Dank voor dit prachtige avontuur.  
 Tineke, Hilde en Elli, het was een warm gevoel om altijd welkom te zijn op het 
secretariaat voor wat aanspraak tussen het onderwijs, de analyses en het typen door. 
Janka, dank voor je inspiratie, je positiviteit en je humor. Ons side-project samen met 
Nanja staat toch maar mooi in Leadership Quarterly. Dear Jen, thanks for bringing me a 
hug whenever I needed one, you’ve become a real friend. Ben en Ellen, dank dat ik zo 
lang in jullie huis mocht wonen en mocht genieten van jullie prachtige tuin. Ten slotte 
wil ik de prettige samenwerking met vele anderen tijdens mijn onderwijsklussen 
noemen. Monique, Maryse, Onne en Bernard, dank voor de fijne samenwerking. 
Daarnaast heb ik veel gehad aan de prettige contacten met andere collega’s die ik in de 
loop de jaren heb mogen ontmoeten. Ik heb me vaak bevoorrecht gevoeld dat ik voor 
congressen naar Stockholm, Montreal, Chicago, Atlanta, Sheffield, Adelaide en 
Birmingham mocht. En dat nog los van alle KLI-cursussen en nationale congressen door 
het hele land. 
 Lieve paranimfen, Roy en Esther. Dank dat jullie mijn paranimfen willen zijn. 
Naast het feit dat mijn blonde haar zo mooi uitkomt tussen jullie donkere bossen, heb ik 
jullie gekozen omdat jullie mij de laatste jaren erg dierbaar zijn geworden. Roy, na de 
roadtrip ben jij mijn homie geworden. Hoe druk je het ook hebt, je maakt altijd tijd voor 
mij en doet daarbij net alsof dat vanzelfsprekend is. Lieve Esther, dankzij Floor zijn wij 
dikke vriendjes geworden, fijn dat je mij op deze belangrijke dag wilt bijstaan! 
 Verder wil ik mijn familie en vrienden bedanken voor de afleiding en de steun in 
de afgelopen jaren. Een aantal wil ik expliciet noemen. Teleurgestelde paranimfen 
moeten er ook zijn. Daan, Wies, Linda, Sanne, Marjolein, Sjoukje, onze weekenden in de 
Kiel zijn inmiddels traditie geworden. Hopelijk zetten we deze traditie nog lang voort. 
Lieve Oude Ballonnen, onze jaarlijkse activiteiten geven me altijd weer nieuwe energie 





gymnasium, dank dat je al die tijd mijn steun en toeverlaat bent geweest. Buurvrouw 
Suzanne, dank voor het luisteren tijdens alle kopjes koffie op ons Haagse dakterras 
tussen het typen door. Marieke, jouw relativeringsvermogen en ongekende intelligentie 
en het koffiedrinken toen je nog in Groningen woonde en via skype sinds je in Engeland 
woont, hebben mij vaak geholpen mijn “problemen” in perspectief te plaatsen. Janneke, 
van jou heb ik veel geleerd. Dank voor al je steun nu en in het verleden. Ik heb veel aan 
jou te danken. 
 Bert en Andrea, mijn lieve ouders, zonder jullie had dit proefschrift er niet 
gelegen en ik dank jullie voor jullie onvoorwaardelijke liefde en steun. En natuurlijk 
mijn zusje Annelies, waar ik altijd terecht kan. 
 Lieve Lizette, na 3 jaar heen en weer pendelen tussen Den Haag en Groningen, 
wonen we eindelijk samen. Het was het wachten waard! Ik geniet van elke dag met jou 
en alles wat we samen ondernemen, zoals onze prachtige reizen naar Canada, Brazilië 
en IJsland. Ik kan niet wachten om te zien wat de toekomst ons samen brengt!  
 En nu is het tijd voor het feestje. 
 
Den Haag, augustus 2013 
Hanneke Grutterink 
